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Can  others  learn  from  China's  remarkable  growth  rate?  We  explore  some  indirect 
determinants  of  China’s  growth  success  including  the  degree  of  openness,  institutional 
change  and  sectoral  change,  based  on  a  cross-province  dataset.  Our  methodology  is  the 
informal growth regression, which permits the introduction of some explanatory variables 
that represent the underlying as well as the proximate causes of growth. We first address the 
problem  of  model  uncertainty  by  adopting  two  approaches  to  model  selection,  Bayesian 
Model Averaging and the automated General-to-Specific approach, to consider a wide range 
of  candidate  predictors  of  growth.  Then  variables  flagged  as  being  important  by  these 
procedures are used in formulating our models, in which the contribution of factors behind 
the proximate determinants are examined using panel data system GMM. All three forms of 
structural change -- relative expansion of the trade sector, of the private sector, and of the 
non-agricultural sector -- are found to raise the growth rate. Moreover, structural change in all 
three  dimensions  was  rapid  over  the  study  period.  Each  change  primarily  represents  an 
improvement in the efficiency of the economy, moving it towards its production frontier. We 
conclude that such improvements in productive efficiency have been an important part of the 
explanation for China's fast growth. 
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acknowledged.   1.  Introduction 
The Chinese economy has experienced remarkable economic growth over the period of 
economic reform. The growth rate of GDP per capita averaged 8.6 percent per annum during 
1978-2007. Nor is there any sign of deceleration in growth: over the years 2000-07, the 
equivalent figure was 9.2 percent, and China accounted for about 35 percent of the growth in 
world GDP at PPP prices
1. For a major country – China accounts for more than one-fifth of 
world population – such rapid progress is unprecedented. It is all the more remarkable in the 
light of China’s poverty – over 300 million people have been lifted out of one-dollar-a-day 
poverty since 1978
2 – and of its difficult transition from being a centrally planned, closed 
economy at the start of reform towards becoming a market economy. 
In this paper we explore the reasons for China’s growth success using a cross-province 
dataset spanning three decades. Our purpose is to explain why China as a whole, and indeed 
all its 31 provinces, has grown so fast. Our expectation is that the analysis of provincial time 
series data will reveal more information about the various determinants of economic growth 
than would an aggregate time series analysis. The use of provincial data expands the sample 
size substantially. 
Economists  are  better  able  to  analyse  the  direct  than  the  indirect  determinants  of 
growth,  and  yet  these  conventional  variables  may  simply  represent  associations  that  are 
themselves  to  be  explained  by  causal  processes.  There  are  three  possible  empirical 
approaches: growth accounting, structural growth modelling, and informal growth regression. 
In contrast to the former two, the third approach permits the introduction of some explanatory 
variables that represent the underlying as well as the proximate causes of growth. Unlike the 
growth accounting method, it does not involve the task of measuring the capital stock and 
thus it avoids making several assumptions about unknown parameters such as factor shares of 
income and the depreciation rate of capital. Two further arguments make us less inclined to 
use the growth accounting approach. Firstly, when total factor productivity (TFP) growth is 
measured as a residual, i.e. as the growth rate in GDP that cannot be accounted for by the 
growth of the observable inputs, it should not be equated with technological change as many 
researchers have done. Rather it is 'a measure of ignorance' (Abramovitz, 1986), covering 
many  factors  like  structural  change,  improvement  in  allocative  efficiency,  economies  of 
scale,  and  other  omitted  variables  and  measurement  errors.  Secondly,  although  growth 
accounting provides a convenient way to allow for the breakdown of observed growth of 
GDP  into  components  associated  with  changes  in  factor  inputs  and  in  production 
technologies, we are not convinced that technological change and investment are separable in 
reality,  i.e.  changing  technology  requires  investment,  and  investment  inevitably  involves 
technological change. This is consistent with the view of Scott (1989) that  technological 
change  and  investment  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  same  thing  and  that  separation  is 
meaningless. Hence, informal growth regression is the methodology that we adopt.   
We  use  recently  developed  approaches  to  model  selection  in  order  to  construct 
empirical models based on robust predictors. It is widely held that growth theories are not 
explicit enough about variables that should be included in the empirical growth models. The 
issue of model uncertainty has attracted much research attention in the context of cross-
country  growth  regressions.  However,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  it  has  been  largely 
                                                            
1 Based on new statistical calculations of PPP exchange rates published in December 2007 by the International 
Comparison Program (ICP), the World Bank and IMF recently revised downward their estimates for China's 
PPP-based GDP by around 40 percent. Despite this revision, China remains the main driver of global growth. 
For example, it contributed nearly 27 percent of world GDP growth in 2007 using the new PPP figure. 
2 The figure is calculated from Ravallion and Chen (2007).  ignored  in  cross-province  growth  studies  of  China,  i.e.  the  existing  literature  has  not 
explicitly or systematically considered the issue of model selection before any investigation 
of particular causes of China's growth. We first use two leading model selection approaches, 
Bayesian Model Averaging and the automated General-to-Specific approach, to examine the 
association between the growth rate of real GDP per capita and a large range of potential 
explanatory  variables.  These  include  the  initial  level  of  income,  fixed  capital  formation, 
human  capital  formation,  population  growth,  degree  of  openness,  institutional  change, 
sectoral change, financial development, infrastructure and regional advantage. The variables 
flagged as being important by these procedures are then used in formulating our baseline 
model, which is estimated using panel data system GMM to control for problems of omitted 
variables, endogeneity and measurement error of regressors. In the second stage,  we also 
examine the robustness of our selected model and the contribution of the main variables. In a 
companion paper (Ding and Knight, 2008b), our focus is on the proximate determinants of 
China's growth, i.e. physical and human capital formation. In this paper we concentrate on 
the growth impacts of some underlying factors that do not enter formal growth models, i.e. 
openness, institutional change and sectoral change
3. These can be viewed as three dimensions 
of structural change, i.e. the relative expansion of the trade sector, of the private sector, and 
of the industrial sector.    
In Section 2 we provide a background to Chinese economic growth and a brief 
literature survey which offers guidance on the choice of variables in our general model. 
Section 3 explains the empirical methodology and reports the results of our basic equations 
and their interpretation. The contribution of three dimensions of structural change -- degree of 
openness, institutional change, and sectoral change -- is then examined in detail in sections 4-
6. Section 7 summarises and concludes. 
2.  Background and growth literature on China  
The growth of the Chinese economy since the start of its economic reform has been a 
process of ‘crossing the river by groping for the stepping stones’, as described by Deng 
Xiaoping: no stereotype reform package was adopted in advance. One reform begat the need, 
or  the  opportunity,  for  another,  and  the  process  became  cumulative.  The  reforms  were 
incremental but hardly slow: huge changes have occurred in less than three decades, as China 
has moved from central planning towards a market economy. The first stage of economic 
reform  (1978-84)  concentrated  on  the  rural  areas.  The  communes  were  disbanded  and 
individual incentives were restored. The second stage (1985-92) was an incremental process 
of reforming the urban economy, in particular the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
were gradually given greater managerial autonomy. The third stage (1993- ) was ignited by 
Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’ to mobilise support for more radical reforms. The private 
sector  –  for  the  first  time  acknowledged  and  accepted  –  was  invigorated.  Moreover, 
administrative and regulatory reform of rural-urban migration, the banking system, the tax 
system, foreign trade, and foreign investment lifted various binding constraints on economic 
growth.  
[Figure 1 here]        
Figure 1, reflecting China’s rapid growth since 1978, shows a cyclical pattern, more 
marked in the first and second stages of reform than in the third stage. Two peaks are evident, 
in 1984-5 and 1992-3, respectively reflecting the outcome of agricultural reforms and the 
                                                            
3 In addition, although sectoral change commonly figures in growth accounting exercises, neither openness nor 
institutions are accommodated in the growth accounting approach.  
 green light given to capitalism. The growth rate troughed in 1989-90 owing to a surge of 
inflation,  social  unrest  and  international  ostracism.  A  further  examination  of  provincial 
growth trends shows that the growth rates of all provinces dropped dramatically in the late 
1980s,  indicating  the  general  detrimental  influence  of  such  adverse  shocks  on  economic 
growth.   
In  summary,  the  reforms  created  market  institutions  and  incentives  that  had  been 
lacking in the socialist planned economy. They improved both static allocative efficiency and 
dynamic factor accumulation. Growth was also facilitated by the absorption of the abundant 
resource, labour, into the expanding, more productive activities. There was drastic movement 
towards  the  economy’s  production  frontier  and  dramatic  movement  of  the  frontier.  It  is 
plausible that together they were responsible for China’s remarkably high rate of growth. 
This is the general hypothesis that we wish to explore. 
There  is  a  large  literature  on  cross-province  growth  regressions  for  China.  Two 
empirical approaches have been used: some version of the neoclassical growth model, often 
in  the  form  of  the  augmented  Solow  model  as  developed  by  Mankiw  et  al.  (1992),  or 
informal growth regressions (for instance, Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), that 
contain among others the explanatory variables in which the researcher is most interested. 
Different periods are analysed, although most are confined to the period of economic reform, 
from 1978 onwards. The methods of analysis vary in sophistication, from cross-section OLS 
to panel data GMM analysis. Research focus covers a broad range of  factors relating to 
variation in growth among  Chinese provinces, such as convergence or divergence, physical 
and  human  capital  investment,  openness,  economic  reform,  geographical  location, 
infrastructure, financial development, labour market development, spatial dependence and 
preferential policies (see, for example, Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Li et al., 1998; Raiser, 1998; 
Chen and Feng, 2000; Démurger, 2001; Zhang, 2001; Bao et al., 2002; Brun et al., 2002; Cai 
et al., 2002; Jones et al., 2003; Guariglia and Poncet, 2006; Hao, 2006; and Yao, 2006). An 
underlying problem in all the research is the need to find causal relationships as opposed to 
mere associations. 
 These studies often use an assortment of economic theories to motivate a variety of 
variables that are included in the cross-province or cross-city growth regressions, and then 
test  the  robustness  of their conclusions  to  the addition of  an  ad hoc  selection of further 
controls. Although each study presents intuitively appealing results, none has directly posed 
the  general  question:  can  the  variations  among  provinces  highlighted  by  cross-province 
growth regressions explain why the economy as a whole has grown so fast? Moreover, no 
systematic consideration has been given to uncertainty about the regression specification, 
with the implication that conventional methods for inference can be misleading. We therefore 
attempt  to  fill  these  two  gaps  in  the  growth  literature  on  China  by  using  some  recently 
developed methods of model selection. The baseline model will then be used to examine the 
deeper causes of rapid economic growth.  
3.  Empirical methodology, data and basic results 
3.1  Empirical methods 
There is no single explicit theoretical framework to guide empirical work on economic 
growth. The neoclassical model (Solow, 1956) predicts that the long-run economic growth 
rate is determined by the rate of exogenous technological progress, and that adjustment to 
stable steady-state growth is achieved by endogenous changes in factor accumulation. It is 
silent on the determinants of technological progress. Endogenous growth theory (for instance, 
Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990) concentrates on technological progress and emphasizes the role of  learning  by  doing,  knowledge  spillover,  research  and  development,  and  education  in 
driving economic growth. Because the theories are not mutually exclusive, the problem of 
model uncertainty concerning which variables should be included to capture the underlying 
data generating process presents a central difficulty for empirical growth analysis. This issue 
has gained increasing attention in the cross-country growth literature following the seminal 
work of Barro (1991), which identified a wide range of variables that are partially correlated 
with GDP per capita growth. A number of econometric and statistical methodologies have 
been developed and applied to handle model uncertainty, among which the Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (Leamer, 1983, 1985; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Temple, 2000), 
Bayesian Model Averaging (Fernández et al., 2001; Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004), and General-
to-Specific  approach  (Hendry  and  Krolzig,  2004;  Hoover  and  Perez,  2004)  are  most 
influential
4. In this paper we adopt Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) and General -to-
Specific approach (GETS) to consider the association between GDP per capita growth rates 
and a wide range of potential explanatory variables. The purpose of the first -stage model 
selection is to provide guidance on the choice of variables to include in the subsequent panel 
data analysis. 
The basic idea of BMA is that the posterior distribution of any parameter of interest is a 
weighted average of the posterior distributions of that param eter under each of the models 
with weights given by the posterior model probabilities. Thus a natural way to think about 
model uncertainty is to admit that we do not know which model is 'true' and instead, attach 
probabilities to different possible models.   By treating parameters and models as random 
variables, the uncertainty about the model is summarized in terms of a probability distribution 
over the space of all possible models. The idea of the GETS procedure is to specify a general 
unrestricted model (GUM), which is assumed to characterize the essential data generating 
process, and then to 'test down' to a parsimonious encompassing and congruent representation 
based on the theory of reduction. The specific regression is a valid restriction of the general  
model if it is statistically well specified and also encompasses every other parsimonious 
regression. One attractive feature of the automatic procedure of model selection is argued to 
be the huge efficiency gain.  
Each of the two procedures has comparative advantages and disadvantages in dealing 
with model uncertainty.  For example, one key disadvantage of BMA is the difficulty of 
interpretation, i.e. parameters are assumed to have the same interpretation regardless of the 
model  they  appear  in;  in  addition,   it  does  not  lead  to  a  simple  model,  making  the 
interpretation  of  results  harder  (Chatfield,  1995).  Criticisms  of  GETS  modelling  are 
commonly concerned with the problems of controlling the overall size of tests in a sequential 
testing process and of interpreting the final results from a classical viewpoint (Owen, 2003). 
Hence, the joint application of BMA and GETS model selection procedures in this paper is to 
combine the strengths of both methods and to circumvent the limitations of each to some 
extent
5.  
Since neither method can handle the   problem of  endogenous  regressors during the 
model selection process, no causal interpretation can be attached to the results at this stage. 
We therefore adopt a two -stage testing approach  to solve this problem. When a subset of 
variables are identified as receiving the greatest support from the underlying data according 
to the model selection results, a further panel data analysis is conducted to investigate the 
deeper determinants of provincial GDP per capita growth in China. Although cross-sectional 
                                                            
4 Detailed discussion of various model selection methods are provided in the working paper version of this paper 
(Ding and Knight, 2008c). 
5 See Appendix 1 for detailed discussion of the two model selection methods. regression has the advantage of focusing on the long-run trends of economic growth, panel 
data methods can control for omitted variables that are persistent over time, and can alleviate 
measurement error and endogeneity biases by use of lags of the regressors as instruments 
(Temple, 1999).   
In the second-stage panel data analysis, we use a system GMM estimator, developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which combines the standard set 
of equations in first-differences with suitably lagged levels as instruments, with an additional 
set of equations in levels with suitably lagged first-differences as instruments. By adding the 
original equation in levels to the system, they found dramatic improvement in efficiency and 
significant  reduction  in  finite  sample  bias  through  exploiting  these  additional  moment 
conditions.  Bond  et  al.  (2001)  also  claimed  that  the  potential  for  obtaining  consistent 
parameter estimates even in the presence of measurement error and endogenous right-hand-
side variables is a considerable strength of the GMM approach in the context of empirical 
growth research. Finally, the robustness of our selected models and the contribution of main 
variables  are  examined  in  detail.  In  this  paper,  our  focus  is  on  the  role  of  openness, 
institutional change and sectoral change in driving China's economic growth.       
3.2  The dataset 
The original sample consists of a panel of 30 provinces with annual data for the period 
1978-2006
6.  The  data  come  mainly  from  China  Compendium  of  Statistics  1949-2004 
compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China. The data of 2005 and 2006 are obtained 
from  the  latest  issues  of  China  Statistical  Yearbook.  The  reliability  of  Chinese  official 
macroeconomic data is often under dispute
7. One important issue is the problem of data 
inconsistency over the sample period. For example, GDP figures for the years 2005 and 2006 
were recompiled on the basis of China's 2004 Economic Census, while corresponding 
provincial data for earlier years remain unrevised. Another problem is data non-comparability 
across provinces. Take population as an example: the household registration population 
figure is provided for some provinces, whereas for others only permanent population data are 
available. In addition, the substantial 'floating population' of temporary migrants is not fully 
accounted for by the population data. These discrepancies can result in measurement error 
problems and may call into question the reliability of our estimation results. Therefore, on the 
one hand, we use a number of 'cleaning rules' (see Appendix 3) to get rid of potential outliers 
for each variable and, on the other hand, we employ the panel data System GMM estimator to 
deal with potential mismeasurement.           
Our first-stage model selection analysis is based on cross -sectional data, in which 
observations are averaged over the entire sample period. For the subsequent panel-data study, 
we opt for the non-overlapping five-year time interval, which is widely used in the cross -
country growth literature (for instance, Islam, 1995; Bond  et al., 2001; Ding and Knight, 
2008a). On the one hand, by comparison with the yearly data,  the five-year average setup 
alleviates the influence of temporary factors associated with business cycles. On the other 
hand,  we are  able  to  maintain more time  series variation than would be  possible  with  a 
longer-period interval.  
                                                            
6 China is administratively decomposed into 31 provinces, minority autonomous regions, and municipalities. 
Since Chongqing becomes a municipal city since 1997, we combine Chongqing with Sichuan for the period 
1997-2006, so making it consistent with earlier observations .
 
7 Influential work on the (un)reliability of China's GDP statistics includes Maddison (1998), Rawski (2001), 
Lardy (2002), Young (2003) and Holz (2006). All the variables are calculated in 1990 constant prices and price indices are province- 
specific
8. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita. Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics of provincial growth rates of real GDP per capita. The annual average 
per capita growth rates of all 30 provinces over the entire reform period was 7.6 percent, with 
an average value of 8.2 percent for the coastal provinces and 7.2 percent for interior 
provinces.  Thus,  China's  economic  reform  generated   across-the-nation  rapid  growth . 
However, that a growth disparity did exist is indicated by the five -percent average growth 
difference between the highest (Zhejiang) and the lowest (Gansu) growth provinces over the 
full sample period. Table 1 also reveals interesting time patterns in China's growth. Rapid 
growth occurred in the first decade, slowed down and became more volatile in the second 
decade, and accelerated but stabilized in the third decade. In the  period 1998-2006, the 
growth disparity across provinces became smaller and even the  slowest-growing province 
(Yunnan) managed an average rate of 7.9 percent.  
[Table 1 here] 
The explanatory variables can be broadly classified into ten categories: initial level of 
income, physical capital formation, human capital formation, population growth rate, degree 
of openness, pace of economic reform or institutional change, sectoral change, infrastructure, 
financial development, and geographic location
9.  
3.3  Basic results 
The validity of a selected model depends primarily on the adequacy of the general 
unrestricted model as an approximation to the data generation process (Doornik and Hendry, 
2007).  A  poorly  specified  general  model  stands  little  chance  of  leading  to  a  good  'final' 
specific model. We consider ten different groups of explanatory variables, and rely on theory 
of economic growth (although sufficiently loose) and previous empirical findings to guide the 
specification of the general model. One important issue is that variables within each category 
are highly correlated, which may result in the problem of multicollinearity and thus inflate 
the coefficient standard errors if all variables are simultaneously included in one general 
regression. The strategy we adopt is to select one or two representative variables from each 
range (based on existing empirical literature and correlation results) to form the basic general 
model, and then to test for the robustness of the model selection results using other variables 
left in each group. Throughout this paper, when we refer to growth we shall, unless indicated 
otherwise, mean annual average growth of real GDP per capita. 
We start from a general model that includes 13 explanatory variables and searches for 
statistically acceptable reductions of this model. The included variables are the logarithm of 
initial  level  of  income  ( ),    ratio  of  fixed  capital  formation  over  GDP  ( ), 
secondary school enrolment rate ( ), ratio of students enrolled in higher education 
to students enrolled in regular secondary education ( ), population natural 
growth rate ( ), ratio of exports to GDP ( ), SOEs' share of total industrial 
output  ( ),  change  in  non-agricultural  share  of  employment  ( ), 
degree  of  industrialization  ( ),    railway  density  ( ),  ratio  of  business 
volume of post and telecommunications to GDP ( ), and a coastal dummy 
( ).  
[Table 2 here] 
                                                            
8 The deflator is the provincial consumer price index. The provincial price data of Tibet are missing for the 
period 1978-89; we use the national aggregate price index to substitute.  
9 See Appendix 3 for detailed variable definitions. We  first  use  BMA  to  isolate  variables  that  have  a  high  posterior  probability  of 
inclusion.  In  Table  2,  we  present  a  summary  of  the  BMA  results,  where  the  posterior 
probability that the variable is included in the model, the posterior mean, and the posterior 
standard  deviation  for  each  variable  are  reported.  We  are  aware  of  the  difficulty  of 
interpreting  parameters  in  economic  terms  when  the  conditioning  variables  differ  across 
models, so our emphasis here lies on the posterior probability of inclusion for each variable, 
i.e. the sum of posterior model probabilities for all models in which each variable appears. 
The results indicate a possibly important role for the initial level of income, SOEs' share of 
total industrial output, secondary school enrolment rate, coastal dummy, exports, fixed capital 
formation,  and  population  growth.  Each  of  these  variables  has  a  posterior  probability  of 
inclusion above 25 percent.  
[Table 3 here] 
We then conduct an automatic model selection exercise using the GETS methodology. 
Starting from the same general model and searching for statistically acceptable reductions, 
Autometrics arrives at a final model with a set of explanatory variables broadly similar to 
those highlighted by the BMA analysis. The OLS estimation of the final specific model is 
reported in Table 3. We find that the initial income level, population growth and SOEs' share 
of industrial output are negatively correlated with GDP per capita growth, whereas fixed 
capital investment, secondary school enrolment rates and exports are positively correlated. 
The major difference between the results of the two methods lies in the role of the regional 
dummy  variable  in  explaining  cross-province  growth  rates,  i.e.  BMA  analysis  flags  the 
coastal dummy as potentially important (with a posterior inclusion probability of 62 percent), 
but GETS drops that variable during reductions. Other variables such as sectoral change, 
infrastructure and financial development are flagged as unimportant predictors of economic 
growth by both model selection methods. However, this outcome may simply reflect the 
highly endogenous nature of these variables, which cannot be accounted for at the model-
selection stage. We will re-examine the role of some of these variables in determining output 
growth in the panel data context later.     
The existence of a robust partial correlation does not imply that the variables of interest 
cause growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Based on the model selection results delivered by 
BMA and GETS, we therefore estimate the baseline model using panel data system GMM, in 
which the endogeneity of regressors can be controlled for. Note that all estimated standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and that time dummies are included. We treat the 
population natural growth rate as an exogenous variable, the initial level of income as a 
predetermined  variable,  and  all  other  variables  including  physical  and  human  capital 
accumulation,  exports  and  SOEs'  share  of  industrial  output  as  potentially  endogenous 
variables. Since the p values of over-identifying tests may be inflated when the number of 
moment conditions is large (Bowsher, 2002), we restrict the number of instruments used for 
each first differenced equation by including a subset of instruments for each predetermined or 
endogenous variable. Several studies have found that the two-step standard errors tend to be 
biased downwards in finite samples (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). By 
applying a correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005), we 
find  very  similar  results  obtained  from  the  one-step  and  two-step  GMM  estimators.  To 
conserve space we report only the heteroscedasticity-robust one-step system GMM results. 
[Table 4 here]     
Interestingly, our panel data system GMM results support the model selected by the 
GETS procedure, i.e. the coastal dummy appears insignificant, and there is not much effect 
on other parameters with or without this regional variable. Controlling for other explanatory variables,  the  initial  level  of  income  is  found  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  subsequent 
provincial  growth  rates,  providing  evidence  of  conditional  convergence  over  the  reform 
period. The estimated coefficient implies that a one percent lower initial level of GDP per 
capita  raises  the  subsequent  growth  rate  of  GDP  per  capita  by  0.06  percentage  points. 
Conditional convergence is an implication of the neoclassical growth model, deriving from 
the assumption of diminishing returns to capital accumulation. The controls imply that the 
provinces have different steady states, and that convergence will lead them to their respective 
steady state levels of income per capita. Despite the challenge posed by endogenous growth 
theory, the neoclassical paradigm of convergence is widely supported by empirical evidence 
in both the cross-country growth literature (for example, Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam, 1995; 
Bond et al., 2001; Ding and Knight, 2008a) and the cross-province growth study on China 
(for example, Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Chen and Feng, 2000; Cai et al., 2002). Table 4 also 
shows estimates of the effects of initial income per capita in the absence of controls for other 
variables: the coefficient is significantly positive, indicating absolute divergence.  
Our findings of absolute divergence and conditional convergence reveal an interesting 
growth pattern in China: poor provinces did not grow faster than rich ones, but they tended to 
converge in a relative sense towards their own steady states. One possible explanation for this 
pattern is that relatively poor provinces have lower stocks of physical and human capital, so 
that the marginal product of capital is higher for them. Another explanation might lie in 
central  government's  regional  development  policies.  During  the  period  1978-1993,  fiscal 
decentralization  reform  gave  provincial  governments  more  discretionary  power  in  tax 
administration  and  revenue  collection.  The  'fiscal  contracting  system'  reduced  central 
government's share of revenue and curtailed fiscal transfers away from rich and towards poor 
provinces (Raiser, 1998; Knight and Li, 1999). In 1994, the 'tax assignment system' reform 
strengthened  central  government's  fiscal  capacity,  which  enabled  it  to  increase  fiscal 
redistribution towards poor provinces and to promote economic development in poor regions 
such as the western provinces and minority areas. This might help to explain why absolute 
divergence has been weaker in recent years (Table 1). 
Fixed  capital  formation  is  an  important  determinant  of  China's  growth,  i.e.  a  one 
percentage point rise in the ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP in a province raises its 
growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.2 percentage points. Human capital investment appears to 
be even more important, i.e. a one percentage point increase in secondary school enrolment 
rates is associated with a higher growth rate of GDP per capita by 1.3 percentage points. 
More  detailed  investigation  of  the  growth  impacts  of  physical  and  human  capital 
accumulation was conducted in a companion paper (Ding and Knight, 2008a). 
Natural increase in population has a negative consequence for growth, i.e. reducing the 
rate of population growth by one percent is associated with an increase in GDP per capita 
growth of 0.5 percent
10. Rapid population growth rate can be referred to as an opportunity 
cost of economic growth, i.e. faster growth of the labour force means more capital has to be 
used to equip the growing labour force, and hence there is less scope for capital deepening, 
with resultant slower  growth of capital per worker and thus output per worker.  China has 
been  keen  to  curb  its  population  growth  mainly  through  the  family  planning  policy, 
implemented since the late 1970s. Despite the controversy over the humanity of the 'one -
child family policy', such tightened demographic policy has been efficient in slowing down 
population growth and reducing the strain on resources in China, which has a positive impact 
on its growth of GDP per capita. 
                                                            
10 We calculate the elasticity of   with respect to   , equivalent to  . Exports are conducive to provincial growth, i.e. a one percentage point increase in the 
ratio of exports to GDP leads to an increase in GDP per capita growth of 0.08 percentage 
points. The SOEs' share of industrial output has a significant and negative impact on output 
growth, i.e. a decrease of one percentage point in the variable raises GDP per capita growth 
rate by 0.04 percentage points. These are the focus of this paper and detailed discussion will 
follow. 
Our system GMM estimation shows that there is no evidence of second order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals and neither the Hansen test nor the Difference 
Sargan test rejects the validity of instruments, all of which results suggest the consistency of 
the estimators being used. In brief, our panel data results favour the model selected by GETS 
procedure and highlights the role of conditional convergence, physical and human capital 
formation, population growth, degree of openness, and institutional change in determining 
economic growth across Chinese provinces.  
4.  Degree of openness 
4.1  Brief literature survey on the openness-growth nexus  
In this section, we examine the role of openness in accelerating China's growth. In trade 
theory, the static effect of openness on the level of income can arise from specialization 
according  to  comparative  advantage,  exploitation  of  increasing  returns,  and  spread  of 
technology and information. The effect of openness on the rate of growth is widely addressed 
in the endogenous growth literature (see, for example, Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 
1990). If greater competition or exposure to new technologies and ideas were to increase the 
rate of technological progress, it would permanently raise the growth rate (Winters, 2004). 
The  channels  through  which  openness  affects  economic  growth  may  lie  in  access  to  the 
technological  knowledge  of  trade  partners  or  foreign  investors  and  to  markets  with  new 
products and inputs, transfer of multinational enterprises' managerial expertise, and greater 
R&D through increasing returns to innovation. It is difficult to judge empirically whether 
faster growth is a transitional or a permanent effect. In any case, since much empirical and 
theoretical work (for instance, Mankiw et al., 1992; Hall and Jones, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Ding and Knight, 2008a) suggests that transitional 
dynamics may take several decades, our research focus on growth rather than on income is 
appropriate. 
The  hypothesis  that  openness  is  a  positive  force  for  growth  has  been  examined  in 
numerous cross-country studies. For example, Dollar (1992) found that a measure of outward 
orientation,  based  on  real  exchange  rate  distortion  and  variability,  is  highly  positively 
correlated with GDP per capita growth in a sample of 95 developing countries. Sachs and 
Warner  (1995)  concluded  that  open  economies,  defined  by  absence  of  five  conditions, 
experienced an average annual growth rate of 2 percent above that of closed economies in the 
period  1970-89,  and  that  convergence  only  occurred  in  the  sample  of  open  countries. 
Edwards (1998) adopted nine alternative openness indices to analyse the connection between 
trade policy and productivity growth during the period 1980-90, and showed that openness 
contributed  to  faster  TFP  growth.  Using  geographic  factors  as  an  instrument  for  trade 
volume, Frankel and Romer (1999) examined causality between trade and income level as 
well as the channels through which trade affects subsequent income. They found that trade 
does have a quantitatively large and robust positive effect on income.   
Empirical research on the openness-growth link faces at least three problems. Firstly, 
the appropriate definition of openness depends on the precise hypothesis to be tested -- in this 
case the effect of openness, or its change, on growth. Secondly, it is difficult to measure openness. Pritchett (1996) pointed out that any single measure is unlikely to capture the 
essence of trade policy. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) argued that the measure of trade policy 
openness may reflect not trade impediments but other bad policies. An index which includes 
all the tariff and non-tariff barriers that distort international trade might be a good measure of 
a country's openness (Yanikkaya, 2003). Efforts have been made in this direction by Leamer 
(1988), Anderson and Neary (1992), Dollar (1992), and Sachs and Warner (1995). However, 
such indices are not relevant for examining the openness of regions within a country owing to 
the nation-wide  nature of trade  policies.  We therefore rely on various  measures  of trade 
volumes and changes in trade volumes to proxy openness.  
Thirdly, it is difficult to establish that causality runs from openness to growth. On the 
one hand, openness can be endogenous. At a macroeconomic level, higher income growth 
may lead to more trade (see, for instance, Frankel and Romer, 1999; Wacziarg, 2001; Yao, 
2006). At a microeconomic level, efficiency and exports may be positively correlated if it is 
the efficient firms that export (Winters, 2004; Park et al., 2008). On the other hand, because 
trade policy is often one among a basket of growth-enhancing policies, the measure of trade 
policy is likely to be correlated with omitted variables in the growth regression, making it 
difficult to identify the causal effect of openness (see, for example, Rodríguez and Rodrik, 
2001; Alesina et al., 2005). Baldwin (2003) has argued that it is unnecessary to isolate the 
effects of trade liberalization on growth if it is indeed part of a broader policy package. 
Nevertheless, the econometric difficulties of endogeneity and omitted variables need to be 
resolved if we are to avoid biased or spurious estimation of the consequence of openness for 
growth. 
4.2  Trade reform in China  
China's pre-reform foreign trade regime was an extreme example of import substitution, 
featured by both a trade monopoly and a tightly-controlled foreign-exchange system. The 
main role of foreign trade was to make up for domestic shortages by imports and to smooth 
out excessive supplies of domestic goods by exports within the planning framework. 
The initial trade reform was characterized by the decentralization of trading rights to 
local  authorities,  industrial  ministries  and  production  enterprises.  Reform  started  from 
Guangdong and Fujian by setting up four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to exploit their 
proximity  to  Hong  Kong  and  foster  export-processing  production.  After  recognizing  the 
opportunities for China in the ongoing restructuring of Asian export production networks, a 
'Coastal Development Strategy' was adopted in the mid-1980s to allow all types of firms in 
the coastal provinces to engage in processing and assembly contracts. In the meantime, to 
provide  incentives  for  firms  to  engage  in  foreign  trade,  the  stringent  control  of  foreign 
exchange  was  relaxed  by  allowing  a  gradual  devaluation  of  Renminbi  (RMB).  A  dual-
exchange-rate regime was introduced in 1986, in which exporters outside the plan could sell 
their foreign-exchange earnings on a lightly regulated secondary market at a higher price.     
China began to move in the direction of a genuinely open economy from the mid-
1990s. A comprehensive package to reform the foreign-exchange regime was introduced in 
1994,  including  unifying  the  double-track  exchange  rate  system,  abolishing  the  foreign 
exchange retention system and swap system, and simplifying procedures for acquiring and 
using foreign exchange for current account transactions. The reforms provided a relatively 
stable exchange rate for RMB and a stable trading environment. China began lowering tariffs 
in preparation for WTO membership, i.e. the average nominal tariff was reduced in stages 
from 43 percent in 1992 to 17 percent in 1999 (Naughton, 2006). The prospect of WTO 
membership was a powerful motivating factor in China's trade reform.  There is a large literature on the relationship between openness and growth in China. 
The hypothesis that China's growth is export-led has been a subject of debate. For example, 
Lawrence (1996) argued that growth was based on exports and inward investment, whereas 
Bramall (2000) provided some illustrative evidence that the export-led growth hypothesis 
was not substantiated for the period 1978-96. Keidel (2007) pointed out that China's growth 
was  essentially  domestically  driven,  given  the  fact  that  interior  provinces  which  are  less 
integrated into global trade also exhibited remarkable growth rates.   
More formal empirical tests have also been conducted. Wei (1995) investigated the 
growth impact of China's open door policy using two city-level datasets. His cross-sectional 
study  suggested  that,  during  the  period  1980-90  as  a  whole,  exports  were  positively 
associated with higher industrial growth across the cities, while in the late 1980s, the cross-
city growth difference was mainly explained by FDI. Using quarterly national data from the 
years  1981-97,  Liu  et  al.  (2002)  showed  that  there  is  a  long-run  bi-directional  causal 
relationship  among  growth,  imports,  exports,  and  FDI  in  a  time-series  cointegration 
framework. From a cross-province panel data analysis for the period 1978-2000, Yao (2006) 
found that both exports and FDI have a strong and positive effect on economic growth and 
concluded  that  the  interaction  among  these  three  variables  formed  a  virtuous  circle  of 
openness and growth in China.  
Firm-level evidence is also available. Kraay (1999), using a panel of Chinese industrial 
enterprises over the period 1988-92, examined whether firms learn from exporting, and found 
that past exports led to significant improvements in firm performance, and that the learning 
effects were more pronounced for established exporters. Park et al. (2008), using  panel data 
on Chinese manufacturers and firm-specific exchange rate shocks as instruments for exports, 
found that exporting increases TFP, total sales and return on assets, so providing evidence in 
favour of the 'learning-by-doing' hypothesis. These China-specific findings are in contrast to 
the general argument made by Bernard et al. (2007) in a survey article that exporters are 
more productive, not as a result of exporting, but because only productive firms are able to 
overcome the costs of entering export markets.      
4.3  Our findings 
We explore the role of openness in driving China's economic growth over the reform 
period using two groups of measures
11. To deal with potential endogeneity problem, levels of 
openness variables lagged by 10-year and 15-year periods are used as instruments in the first-
differences equations, and first-differenced openness variables lagged by 5-year periods are 
used as additional instruments for the levels equations in  the system GMM estimation. The 
panel data method which we adopt is also able to control for the omitted variables that are 
persistent over time. 
The first group is calculated using trade volumes. The most basic measure of trade 
intensity is the simple trade share ( ), which is the ratio of exports plus imports to 
GDP. Export share and import share in GDP (  and  ) are also used. 
Exports contribute to growth by enabling the economy to exploit its comparative advantage 
and  exposing  the  exporting  firms  to  the  rigour  of  international  competition.  However, 
Edwards (1993) argued that too much emphasis had been placed on exports in the earlier 
literature. The theory of comparative advantage also predicts an efficiency gain through the 
                                                            
11 The adoption of foreign technology and international business practices through the use of FDI is potentially 
an important channel through which openness stimulates growth. Since it is interesting to compare the growth 
impact  of  FDI  with  that  of domestic  investment,  the  consequence  of FDI  for  China's  economic  growth  is 
examined in our companion paper (Ding and Knight, 2008b) rather than in this one.  import of goods and services that are otherwise too costly to produce within the country, and 
that producers for the domestic market can be stimulated by competition from imports. By 
examining four types of imports (ideas, goods and services, capital, and institutions), Rodrik 
(1999) even claimed that the benefits of openness lie on the import side rather than the export 
side. Consistent with Yanikkaya (2003), we hypothesize that both exports and imports are 
important for a country's economic development, and should be considered complements 
rather than alternatives.   
[Table 5 here] 
The results for trade volume and its two components are presented in Table 5 (Models 
1-3). Trade share, export share, and import share in GDP are each found to have significant 
and positive effects on the growth rate of GDP per capita. The similar magnitude of the 
coefficients of exports and imports indicates the equally important role of both dimensions of 
trade openness in accelerating China's economic growth, i.e. a one percentage point rise in 
the ratio of exports or imports to GDP in a province raises its growth rate of GDP per capita 
by 0.08 percentage points.  
[Figure 2 here] 
China began trade liberalization with one of the most closed economies in the world: 
the total trade over GDP ratio was marginally above 10 percent in 1978 (Figure 2). With its 
open  door  policy,  China's  degree  of  integration  into  the  world  economy  has  improved 
dramatically; total trade amounted to 72 percent of GDP in 2006. Both exports and imports as 
a share of GDP have climbed strongly and persistently, with two setbacks in the late 1980s 
and in the late 1990s. China is a big net importer of intermediate capital-intensive and skill-
intensive commodities such as machinery, electronics, and other heavy, process-technology 
industrial products, and a big net exporter of final labour-intensive commodities (Naughton, 
2006). This pattern of exports and imports corresponds well to the principle of comparative-
advantage given that China is a labour-rich, land-scarce, and capital-scarce economy. 
[Figure 3 here]   
The role of trade volumes in accelerating growth may not have been possible without 
the marked changes that occurred in the structure of trade. Figure 3 reflects these changes in 
the composition of China's exports over the period 1984-2006. There was a dramatic shift to 
manufacturing products and a corresponding decline in natural-resource based products, e.g. 
agricultural  raw  materials,  food  and  fuels.  This  improved  the  prospects  for  rapid  export 
growth,  and  for  gains  in  productive  efficiency.  By  contrast,  some  other  slower-growing 
developing  areas,  such  as  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  remain  heavily  dependent  on  exports  of 
primary commodities which are more vulnerable to adverse market conditions. The effect on 
growth can be a matter not only of how much countries export but also of what they export.   
Our second group of openness measures is based on changes in the volume of trade. 
According to Dollar and Kraay (2004), trade volumes are endogenous variables which may 
reflect a wide range of factors other than trade policy, such as geographic characteristics. 
They therefore regarded the proportional changes in trade volumes relative to GDP as a better 
measure for openness, given the fact that geography and many other unobserved country or 
region characteristics that drive both growth and trade vary little over time. However, not 
everyone is convinced by their arguments. Nye et al. (2002) argued that countries with the 
large increase in trade volumes are those with the lowest trade volumes, making Dollar and 
Kraay's definition of 'globalisers' contradictory. Nevertheless, we use the changes of trade 
volumes  ( ),  export  volumes  ( ),  and  import  volumes  ( )  as 
additional measures of openness.     [Figure 4 here] 
In Table 5 (Models 4-6), we find that the growth rates of trade ( ), exports 
( ), and imports ( ) each have significantly positive impacts on the growth 
rate of GDP per capita, i.e.  a one percentage point rise in the growth rate of exports or 
imports  leads  to  an  increase  in  GDP  per  capita  growth  of  0.2  or  0.1  percentage  points 
respectively. Figure 4 shows that the growth of exports exhibited much higher volatility than 
that of imports or overall trade in the early period of reform but that the growth of all three 
variables became synchronized after the mid-1990s. All growth rates slowed down in the late 
1990s, owing to the adverse influence of the Asian Financial Crisis, but surged again after the 
renewed trade liberalization signalled by WTO accession in late 2001. Whereas trade levels 
were much higher at the end of the study period than at the start, being measured from a 
small initial base the percentage growth of trade volumes was considerably faster in the first 
than in the second half of our period.     
We  then  test  for  the  growth  impacts  of  both  the  levels  and  growth  rates  of  trade 
volumes in Models 7-9, Table 5. Despite the insignificance of export volumes in Model 8, 
our results suggest that both variables are important for the growth rate of GDP per capita, 
i.e. a one percentage point rise in the ratio of total trade to GDP in a province raises its 
growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.02 percentage points, and a one percentage point increase 
in the growth rate of trade leads to an increase in GDP per capita growth of 0.2 percentage 
points.        
In  brief,  China's  foreign  trade  reform  has  been  a  process  of  shifting  from  import 
substitution  towards  export  promotion  through  decentralising  foreign  trade  rights  and 
liberalising  foreign  exchange  system.  This  has  led  to  a  sharp  increase  in  China's  trade 
volumes and a deeper integration into the world economy. Both the level of and the change in 
the share of trade in GDP are found to raise growth, the latter more so than the former. Not 
only exports but also imports have a positive effect, change in the former more so than 
change in the latter. 
5.  Institutional change 
5.1  Brief literature survey on institutions and growth 
Institutions, being the rules that govern and shape the interactions of human beings, 
structure economic incentives (North, 1990:3). The institutional framework consists of both 
formal  entities,  like  laws,  constitutions,  written  contracts,  market  exchanges  and 
organizational  rules,  and  informal  ones,  like  shared  values,  norms,  customs,  ethics,  and 
ideology (Lin and Nugent, 1995). It is widely held that institutions play an important role in 
economic  development  and  growth.  Hall  and  Jones  (1999)  and  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2005) 
argued  that  standard  economic  models  of  factor  accumulation  and  endogenous  technical 
change  provide  only  proximate  explanations  of  economic  growth,  whereas  differences  in 
institutions are the fundamental causes of differential growth across countries. Lin (2007) 
emphasized the role of institutional changes in driving economic development by promoting 
technological innovation and more efficient resource allocation.      
Research on institutions and growth raises three issues -- relating to concepts, measures 
and causation. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005) examined property rights broadly interpreted, as 
did Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995) examined corruption, administrative and judicial 
efficiency, and political stability, and Hall and Jones (1999) 'social infrastructure'. In each 
case proxies and instruments had to be found for these vague and potentially endogenous 
influences. Market formation has been rapid in China and its timing across provinces has varied. 
Several  cross-province  studies  of  the  effect  of  institutional  change  on  growth  have  been 
conducted (Lin, 1992; Chen and Feng, 2000; Cai et al., 2002; Biggeri, 2003; Hasan et al., 
2008).  For  instance,  Lin  (1992)  adopted  a  production  function  approach  to  assess  the 
contributions to China's agricultural growth over the reform period of institutional change 
(decentralising decision making and providing incentives) and other influences. Transforming 
from the production-team to the household responsibility system was found to improve total 
factor productivity and to account for about half of the output growth during the period 1978-
84. Cai et al. (2002) constructed a marketization index
12 to examine the effect of market -
oriented institutional reforms on economic growth, and found a significantly positive role for 
institutional factors, based on OLS and FGLS estimators. Hasan et al. (2008) concluded from 
their panel data GMM results that the emergence of the market economy, the establishment 
of secure property rights, the growth of a private sector, the development of financial and 
legal institutions, and the representation of minor parties in province governance accelerated 
provincial growth over the period 1986-2003.                
5.2  Ownership as a measure of institutions for China 
Institutions  are  arguably  weak  in many  developing  countries  because  the  rules  that 
ensure the use and trading of property rights are absent or poorly enforced (Aron, 2000; Lin, 
2007). However, with its institutions devised and created for a centrally planned command 
economy, China at the start of economic reform was at a particularly severe disadvantage. 
The government committed to experimentalism and gradualism in its institutional reform. 
One minor reform often created the need for another, and so on. New economic institutions 
thus  evolved  by  a  process  of  cumulative  causation.  Compared  with  most  developing 
countries,  China's  institutional  change  was  fast;  compared  with  most  former  communist 
countries, it was slow.  
One  distinguishing  feature  of  China's  institutional  reform  is  the  emergence  of  new 
forms of ownership. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the collectively-owned 'township and 
village enterprises' (TVEs) experienced a significant expansion and played a catalytic role in 
pushing  China  towards  a  market  economy.  Several  factors  contributed  to  the  rapid 
development  of  rural  industry  in  China,  the  most  important  of  which  were  access  to 
previously protected or empty markets, their competitive advantage from low wages, and 
local government support. Jefferson et al. (1998) found empirical evidence that TVEs had 
institutional  advantages  over  SOEs.  Unlike  SOEs,  TVEs  faced  relatively  hard  budget 
constraints, so generating profit incentives. The entry of TVEs also provided competition for 
SOEs. However, when restrictions on the private sector were gradually relaxed and when the 
urban reforms provided SOEs with more incentives to seek out profitable opportunities and to 
compete  successfully  against  them,  TVEs  began  to  lose  their  profitability;  many  were 
transformed into private businesses after the mid-1990s.    
Deng  Xiaoping's  southern  tour  of  1992  formally  gave  the  green  light  for  capitalist 
development. The Company Law adopted in 1994 provided a uniform legal framework into 
which all of the ownership forms  fit, signalling the introduction of more clearly defined 
property rights and the start of dramatic institutional change implied by the rapid downsizing 
of the state sector. Many SOEs and urban collective firms were shut down, and employment 
in SOEs and urban collective firms shrank by over 40 percent and 75 percent respectively 
                                                            
12 Defined as an arithmetic average of the share of total commodity sales by the non-state sector, the proportion 
of non-state fixed capital investment in investment in total investment, the share of non-state industrial output in 
the total output, and foreign trade dependence.  between 1995 and 2006
13. A large number of SOEs and urban collective firms were either 
privatized or turned into shareholding entities that are increasingly  dominated by private 
owners (Lin and Zhu, 2001; Garnaut  et  al.,  2005).  However,  SOEs  remain  dominant  in 
energy, natural resources and a few strategic or monopolistic sectors that are controlled and 
protected by central government.  
Economic institutions comprise several elements. In the Chinese context, the allocation 
of decision-making rights, the motives of decision-makers, the incentives faced by decision-
makers, and the degree of economic certainty and security within which decisions are made, 
have been referred to as 'property rights' (Jefferson et al., 1998). The economic environment 
which determines the degree of competition among producers is also relevant. The different 
forms of ownership are closely related to both property rights and competition. The policy of 
permitting privatization and encouraging private enterprises both generated incentives for 
profits and thus for efficiency, and also required security of property. Although urban reform 
provided SOEs with greater autonomy in production and investment decision-making and a 
greater share of profits that could be retained, the principal-agent problem inherent in state-
ownership meant that efficiency and profitability in the state sector remained lower than in 
the non-state sector. The three main elements of institutional change -- improving incentives, 
strengthening  competition,  and  changing  ownership  --  evolved  together,  and  by  their 
interactions pulled each other along.  
It is difficult to find data that adequately measure China's institutional development at 
the provincial level for the entire sample period. We have good measures neither of property 
rights as defined above nor of the degree of competition. Instead we rely on the fact that the 
evolution of economic institutions has paralleled the changes in the structure of ownership. In 
order to proxy institutional changes, we use three groups of variables: the ownership patterns 
of investment, of industrial output, and of employment. We are not alone in adopting this 
approach: the relative size of the private sector has been widely used a proxy for the extent of 
property rights protection in China (for instance, Cull and Xu, 2005; Hasan et al., 2008). All 
the institution measures are treated as potentially endogenous variables in our panel data 
GMM  estimation,  in  which  levels of institution  variables lagged  by 10-year and 15-year 
periods  are  used  as  instruments  in  the  first-differences  equations,  and  first-differenced 
institution variables lagged by 5-year period are used as additional instruments for the levels 
equations.  
5.3  Our findings 
In  Table  6  (Models  10-12),  investment  in  fixed  assets  is  classified  according  to 
ownership:  investment  spending  by  SOEs  ( ),  collective  enterprises 
( ), and private enterprises ( ). As in Brandt and Zhu 
(2000),  our  estimate  shows  that  the  growth  rate  of  GDP  per  capita  falls  as  the  share  of 
investment by SOEs increases (Model 10), i.e. reducing the share of SOEs in total fixed 
investment by one percentage point is  associated  with  an  increase  in  GDP  per  capita  
growth  of  0.11  percentage  points. Consequently, the recent decline in SOEs' share of fixed 
investment  is  a  positive  development.  The  coefficient  on  investment  by  collective  firms 
appears insignificant (Model 11). The collective economy consists of both TVEs and urban 
collectives  firms.  The  former  are  generally  said  to  have  been  dynamic,  especially  in  the 
1980s, whereas the latter are run by local governments and still suffer from the disincentives 
associated with soft budget constraints and principal-agent problems. We therefore had no 
clear hypothesis about the impact of collective firms on growth. Private-sector investment 
                                                            
13  Data come from China Statistical Yearbook 2007 (p. 128). affects growth positively, i.e. a one percentage point increase in this variable is associated 
with an increased growth rate of 0.19 percentage points (Model 12). This result is consistent 
with the evidence that the average return on investment in the private sector is higher than 
that in the SOEs (Riedel et al., 2007: 40-42).  
[Table 6 here] 
In  Models  13-15,  we  employ  the  share  of  gross  industrial  output  value  of  SOEs 
( ),    of  collective  enterprises  ( ),  and  of  private enterprises 
( ) as proxies for institutional change. As expected, the growth rate of GDP 
per capita is influenced negatively by the SOEs' share of output (Model 13), insignificantly 
by that of collective firms (Model 14), and positively by that of private firms (Model 15). 
Similar results hold when measures of employment are adopted in Models 16-18. The size of 
state sector has a negative consequence for growth (Model 16), and the expansion of private 
sector is conducive to growth (Model 18). It is therefore a positive development that the 
centre of gravity of the economy has been shifting from the state to the private sector.  
In brief, we find that China's economic growth can be partly ascribed to the evolution 
of the country's economic institutions. Whether investment, output or employment is used as 
the  criterion,  the  effect  of  a  decrease  in  state  ownership  and  of  an  increase  in  private 
ownership is to increase growth. The private sector, with its incentives for profit and thus for 
efficiency, is a driving force in China's growth. China's experience suggests that, through 
incremental changes which provide people with the right incentives, it is possible to unleash 
rapid growth on a weak institutional base, so permitting a successful transition from central 
planning to a well-functioning market economy. This is consistent with the view of Rodrik 
(2003) that deep and extensive reforms are not required for dynamic growth at the onset of 
the transition. Instead, government should encourage and pay attention to local and private 
initiatives in institutional changes (Lin, 2007).   
6.  Sectoral change and industrialization 
6.1  Brief literature survey on sectoral change, industrialization and growth 
The economic development literature has long recognized the role of sectoral change in 
promoting growth. Firstly, in the seminal dual-economy model of Lewis (1954), transferring 
labour  from  low-  to  high-productivity  sectors  is  conducive  to  economic  growth.  If  the 
marginal product of labour is lower in agriculture, the movement of labour to sectors, such as 
industry, where the marginal product is higher will raise total output. Secondly, it is arguable 
that  manufacturing  benefits  from  more  production  externalities  than  does  agriculture 
(Corden,  1974).  Production  by  one  firm  leads  not  only  to  current  output  but  also  to 
accumulation of knowledge which can also spread to other firms as time passes. This kind of 
dynamic  external  economy  can  reduce  industrial  costs  over  time.  Shifting  the  output  or 
employment  pattern  from  agriculture  to  industry  can  generate  learning  economies,  thus 
increasing the rate of economic growth. Thirdly, if the industrial sector is more subject to 
economies of scale than is the agricultural sector, a relatively larger industrial sector provides 
scope for faster economic growth.  
Robinson (1971) estimated growth regressions to assess the effect of factor transfers 
(both capital and labour) on economic growth in 39 developing countries over the period 
1958-66. The cross-section OLS estimates suggested an important role for factor reallocation 
in growth, and also the existence of structural disequilibrium in the factor markets. Using a 
similar methodology, Feder (1986) constructed and estimated a disequilibrium model based 
on productivity differentials between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors for 30 semi-industrialised  countries  over  the  period  1964-73.  He  found  strong  evidence  of  sectoral 
differences  in  the  marginal  productivity  of  factors,  and  concluded  that  countries  which 
pursued accelerated industrial growth tended to grow faster because resource allocation was 
improved. However, one shortcoming of both studies is that the sectoral difference in factor 
marginal productivities is treated as the same across countries. 
Dowrick  and  Gemmell  (1991)  used  growth  accounting  to  test  the  hypothesis  that 
barriers  to  the  transfer  of  labour  between  sectors  and  countries  drive  a  wedge  between 
sectoral marginal products. In a sample of rich and middle-income countries over the period 
1960-85, their test results indicated that the degree of disequilibrium was not the same across 
countries, but proportional to the observed ratio of sectoral labour productivities. The ratio of 
labour  average  productivity  between  sectors  was  found  to  decrease  with  the  level  of 
development. Poirson (2001) extended the analysis of the sectoral change-growth nexus to 
the panel data context. After controlling for unobserved differences in productivity growth 
and other omitted variables, he found that intersectoral labour reallocation made a significant 
contribution to growth differences across 65 developing and industrial countries over the 
period  1960-90.  Poirson  confirmed  Dowrick  and  Gemmell's  (1991)  finding  that  the 
reallocation effect of labour productivity growth varied with the labour productivity in one 
sector relative to the other. The results proved to be robust when the endogeneity of sectoral 
change variables were controlled for using instrumental variable estimation methods.  
Vollrath (2005) examined the static effect of factor market distortions on aggregate 
productivity and  income  level  using the growth accounting approach for a  sample of 42 
countries. He showed that variation across countries in the degree of resource misallocation 
between  agriculture  and  non-agriculture  accounted  for  30-40  percent  of  the  variation  in 
income  per  capita,  and  up  to  80  percent  of  the  variation  in  aggregate  TFP.  Temple  and 
Wöβmann (2006) extended Vollrath's work to a dynamic model, focusing on the relationship 
between sectoral change and economic growth. Changes in the structure of employment can 
account for a significant fraction of the observed variation in productivity growth among 76 
countries over the period 1960-96. Moreover, the cross-section relationship between growth 
and  the  extent  of  sectoral  change  was  found  to  be  nonlinear,  and  the  extent  of  dualism 
measured by labour productivity differentials declined over time.  
6.2  Dualism and sectoral change in China 
At the start of economic reform China had a labour surplus economy par excellence. 
The various attempts to measure the extent of surplus labour (surveyed by Taylor, 1988) 
produced a majority view that surplus labour represented about a third of the rural labour 
force, although it had been disguised by work sharing within the communes. According to the 
official data, the agricultural labour force fell from 71 percent of the total in 1978 to 46 
percent in 2000. It is very likely that the transfer of labour from rural agriculture to urban, 
and  also  rural,  industry  involved  a  sharp  increase  in  its  marginal  product.  For  instance, 
Knight and Song (2005: 188-99) found that the estimated average and marginal return to rural 
labour were far higher in non-farm than in farm activities in 1994, the ratios being 1.5 to 1 
and  10.0  to  1  respectively.  Moreover,  a  rural  household's  non-farm  employment  had 
negligible  opportunity  cost  in  terms  of  farm  work.  Knight  and  Song  (2005:  103-9)  also 
estimated that the marginal product of migrants employed in urban enterprises in 1995 far 
exceeded their wage, a disequilibrium caused by official restrictions on the employment of 
migrants. This evidence shows why it is plausible that the transfer of labour out of agriculture 
had an important effect on the rate of economic growth.   The impact of sectoral change and industrialization on economic growth has received 
increasing research attention in the growth literature on China. Brandt et al. (2008) adopted a 
growth accounting approach to examine the impact of both within-sector productivity growth 
and  between-sector  reallocation  on  aggregate  output  growth  in  China.  Their  three-sector 
structural growth model suggested that China's non-state non-agricultural sector was the key 
driver of economic growth over the period 1978-2004. Evidence has also been found in the 
cross-province growth regression literature. Using the initial level as instrument, Chen and 
Feng (2000) found a positive effect of the degree of industrialization, measured as the gross 
output  value  of  industry  as  a  percentage  of  provincial  income,  on  the  growth  rate  of 
provincial GDP per capita in their cross-sectional analysis over the period of 1978-89. Cai et 
al. (2002) used the relative labour productivity of agriculture as a measure of labour market 
distortion. Their OLS and FGLS panel data estimation results for the period 1978-98 showed 
that labour market distortion reduced provincial growth rates. Ying (2003) employed a spatial 
econometric approach to examine the consequence of structural transformation for China's 
post-reform growth performance. The growth of the non-farm labour force was recognized as 
the most important contribution to provincial growth in a spatial lag model. However, the 
issue of the potential endogeneity of sectoral change variables is not adequately addressed in 
any of these studies, and no attempts have been made to apply a two-sector dual economy 
model in the cross-province growth literature for China.     
6.3  Our findings 
Sectoral  change  variables  are  not  highlighted  as  important  predictors  of  economic 
growth by either model selection procedure, and therefore do not enter our baseline model. 
However, this outcome may result from the highly endogenous nature of the sectoral change 
variables,  which  cannot  be  accounted  for  at  the  cross-sectional  model  selection  stage. 
Accordingly  we  estimate  the  effect  of  labour  reallocation  between  sectors  on  provincial 
growth  in  the  panel  data  context,  based  on  two  cross-country  empirical  growth  models 
suitable for dual economies. To deal with potential endogeneity problem, levels of sectoral 
change variables lagged by 10-year and 15-year periods are used as instruments in the first-
differences equations, and first-differenced sectoral change variables lagged by 5-year period 
are used as additional instruments for the levels equations in the system GMM estimation.   
Firstly, we test the hypothesis of Temple and Wöβmann (2006) that changes in the 
structure of employment will raise total output when the marginal product of labour varies 
across sectors. They also predicted that the relationship between growth and sectoral change 
is convex, i.e. the growth impact of a given extent of sectoral change is greater where sectoral 
change is faster. The intuition is that if wages are roughly equal to marginal products, the 
growth bonus associated with sectoral change is increasing in the size of the intersectoral 
wage differential. In other words, provinces have the largest wage differential are assumed to 
be those in which the observed extent of sectoral change is greatest, reflecting large private 
gains from switching sectors.  
[Table 7 here] 
In  Table  7  (Models  19-24),  following  Temple  and  Wöβmann  (2006),  two  sets  of 
sectoral  change  variables  are  defined  in  a  two-sector  general  equilibrium  model  of 
production
14. The first set of sectoral change variables (  and  ) are derived 
from the assumption that the labour share in output is the same across provinces. The second 
set of sectoral change variables (  and  ) is based on the assumption that 
all provinces have the same Cobb -Douglas technologies in agriculture.   and 
                                                            
14 See Appendix 2 for detailed model derivation and variable definition.  are the linear terms reflecting changes of employment in the non-agricultural 
sector;   and   are the quadratic terms capturing the convexity effect. We find 
that the linear terms (  and  ) are positive and significant, suggesting 
that  reallocating  labour  from  agriculture  to  non-agriculture  is  conducive  to  growth  of 
provincial GDP per capita. In contrast with cross-country analysis (for instance, Temple and 
Wöβmann, 2006; Ding and Knight, 2008a), we find no evidence of a convex relationship. 
This result is robust when two sectoral change variables enter the regression either jointly or 
individually. 
We  then  test  an  alternative  hypothesis  of  Poirson  (2001)  that  the  effect  of  labour 
reallocation on growth depends on the magnitude of the labour productivity gap between 
sectors. In his model, there are also two sectoral change terms: change in labour share in non-
agricultural sector ( ), the same as Temple and Wöβmann's (2006) definition, and 
change in labour share in non-agricultural sector weighted by relative labour productivity 
( ). In Models 20, 25 and 26, we find that both terms are positive and 
statistically significant, whether they enter the regression jointly or individually. Therefore, 
our  results  support  Poirson's  hypothesis  that  the  labour  reallocation  effect  on  growth  is 
greater the higher is the average productivity in non-agriculture relative to agriculture. 
Sectoral change can alternatively be depicted as the changing share of industry in total 
output. In Models 27-29, we test both the static role of industrialization level and the dynamic 
sectoral  change  in  driving  economic  growth.  We  hypothesize  that  more  industrialized 
provinces grow faster than those less industrialized. Surprisingly, we find that the degree of 
industrialization ( ), defined as the ratio of gross industrial output value to the sum of 
gross industrial and agricultural output value, appears insignificant in determining provincial 
GDP per capita growth (Model 27). Rather, it is the sectoral change in output, measured as 
the growth of industrialization ( ),  that matters for economic growth, i.e. a one 
percentage point rise in the growth rate of industrialization in a province raises its growth rate 
of GDP per capita by 0.2 percentage points (Models 28-29). Thus it is the structural change 
of output, rather than the structure of output, that contributes to growth.   
In  summary,  China's  economic  growth  has  been  intertwined  with  dramatic  sectoral 
change in  both  employment and  output over the  reform period.  Our results indicate  that 
transferring labour from agriculture to non-agriculture contributes significantly to economic 
growth. No evidence is found for Temple and Wöβmann's (2006) prediction of a convex 
relationship between sectoral change and growth. Instead, our estimation results support the 
hypothesis of Poirson (2001) that the growth impact of labour reallocation is bigger for those 
provinces that have higher average productivity in  non-agriculture  relative to agriculture. 
Change  in  the  structure  of  output  from  the  agricultural  sector  to  the  industrial  sector  is 
conducive  to  economic  growth.  However,  a  higher  level  of  industrialization  itself  is  not 
associated  with  faster  growth  across  China's  provinces.  Our  results  remain  robust  when 
various sensitivity tests are conducted
15.         
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, our research focus has been on various underlying influences on China's 
economic growth. To deal with the issue of model uncertainty, a fundamental problem for 
empirical research in economic growth, we adopted BMA and GETS to consider a wide 
range of candidate predictors of economic growth in China. The first-stage model selection 
                                                            
15 For example, according to Bernard et al. (2007), changes in the sectoral structure of both employment and 
output can be caused by trade liberalization. We therefore remove the openness measure and find that the 
growth  impact of sectoral change remains intact.   results identified a role for conditional convergence, physical and human capital formation, 
population growth, degree of openness, and institutional change in determining output growth 
across China's provinces. The application of panel data system GMM added sectoral change 
to the list. Using that framework, we investigated in some detail the growth impact of three 
dimensions of structural change in China, i.e. degree of openness, institutional change and 
sectoral change.  
What light has the analysis thrown on the question posed in our title: why has China 
grown so fast? The structure of the economy itself -- level rather than change -- affects the 
growth rate in the cases of trade and ownership but not of production. Having a large trade 
sector or a large private sector itself raises a province's growth rate. However, change in 
structure is even more important. China as a whole has undergone three forms of drastic 
structural change over the period of economic reform and each of them helps to explain the 
remarkably high growth rate. Two of these changes, albeit less drastic, are likely to be shared 
by  many  developing  countries;  only  privatisation  is  more  a  feature  of  transition  than  of 
development. 
The change of the trade share in GDP has had a positive effect, and not only exports but 
also imports have contributed. Posing the counterfactual 'How would the growth rate have 
altered if the trade ratio had remained constant?', we find (on the basis of Table 5, Model 4) 
that the predicted annual average provincial growth of GDP per capita in China over the 
study period was 8.1 percent, whereas the growth of the ratio of trade to GDP was  18.1 
percent per annum. The contribution to growth of this structural change was no less than 3.2 
percentage points per annum. These results are consistent with growth benefiting from the 
improved resource allocation, technology and competition that openness can bring.  
The  second  contribution  has  come  from  the  rapid  privatization  of  the  economy. 
Whether we use investment, output or employment as the criterion, we find the effect of state 
ownership on growth to be negative and that of private ownership to be positive. Private 
enterprise output averaged 22.0 percent of total industrial output in China over the full period. 
If it had remained at its 1978 level (1.2 percent), growth would have been 0.7 percentage 
points lower, at 7.4 percent per annum (on the basis of Table 6, Model 15). This pattern is 
consistent with the improvement in incentives that a greater role for profit-seeking can bring.  
Thirdly, it is clear that the remarkable sectoral changes have also made an important 
contribution  to  growth.  The  average  change  in  the  share  of  employment  in  the  non-
agricultural sector over the full sample period was 1.0 percent per annum. If instead it had not 
occurred, the coefficient (in Table 7, Model 20) implies that China's growth of GDP per 
capita would have fallen by one percentage point, from 8.1 to 7.1 percent per annum, holding 
other variables constant. This evidence is consistent with there being efficiency gains from 
improved sectoral labour allocation and also externalities specific to industry. 
By  altering  mean  values  of  key  variables  based  on  model  estimation,  these  simple 
simulations contain the questionable assumption that a change in one variable would not 
change the other variables in the equation. It is likely that the three types of structural change 
are  closely  interrelated  with  each  other.  We  therefore  estimate  an  equation  that 
simultaneously incorporates trade openness, private share of industrial output, and sectoral 
change. The full  effect of structural change on growth  is summed  up to  4.1 percent per 
annum
16. There remains the possibility that these structural change variables are correlated 
                                                            
16 The coefficients of all three structural change variables are significantly positive and the contributions of trade 
openness, privatization and sectoral change to annual growth rate of GDP per capita are 1.9 percent, 1.3 percent, 
and  0.9 percent respectively.    with other variables in the regression, for instance, physical and human capital formation, so 
that even their joint effect cannot be isolated. We thus use these figures simply to illustrate 
the rough orders of magnitude of the potential contribution of structural change to the growth 
rate. 
Each of these three forms of structural change has involved an improvement in the 
efficiency of the economy by bringing it closer to its production frontier. They have also 
involved some outward movement of the production frontier, for instance, improvement in 
technology from trade openness or from greater incentives for research and development. 
However,  the  main  extension  of  the  production  possibility  curve  has  come  from  the 
accumulation of physical and human capital -- an issue examined, within the same model 
framework, in our companion paper (Ding and Knight, 2008b).          
   References 
 
Abramovitz, M., 1986. Catching Up, Forging ahead, and falling behind. Journal of Economic 
History 46 (2), 385-406. 
Acemoglu,  D.,  Johnson,  S.,  Robinson,  J.  A.,  2001.  The  colonial  origins  of  comparative 
development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., 2005. Institutions as a fundamental cause of 
long-run growth. In Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. N., Handbook of Economic Growth (Vol. 
1A). Elsevier B.V., Amsterdam, pp.386-472. 
Alesina, A., Spolaore E., Wacziarg, R., 2005. Trade, growth and the size of countries. In P. 
Aghion,  Durlauf,  S.  N.,  Handbook  of  Economic  Growth  (Vol.1B).  Elsevier  B.V., 
Amsterdam, pp.1499-1542. 
Anderson, J. E., Neary, J. P., 1992. Trade reform with quotas, partial rent retention, and 
tariffs. Econometrica 60, 57-76. 
Arellano,  M.,  Bond,  S.,  1991.  Some  tests  of  specification  for  panel  data:  Monte  Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies 58, 
277-297. 
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models. Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-52. 
Aron, J., 2000. Growth and institutions: a review of the evidence. World Bank Research 
Observer 15 (1), 99-135. 
Baldwin,  R.  E.,  2003.  Openness  and  growth:  what's  the  empirical  relationship.  NBER 
Working Paper Series No. 9578. 
Bao, S. M., Chang, G. H., Sachs, J. D., Woo, W. T., 2002. Geographic factors and China's 
regional development under market reforms, 1978-1998. China Economic Review 13, 
89-111. 
Barro, R. J., 1991. Economic growth in a cross section of countries. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106 (2), 407-443. 
Barro,  R.  J.,  Sala-i-Martin,  X.  X.,  2004.  Economic  Growth  (second  ed.).  MIT  Press, 
Cambridge MA. 
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, B., Redding, S. J., Schott, P. K., 2007. Firms in international trade. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3), 105-130. 
Biggeri, M., 2003. Key factors of recent provincial economic growth. Journal of Chinese 
Economic and Business Studies 1 (2), 159-183. 
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models. Journal of Econometrics 87(1), 115-143. 
Bond,  S.,  Hoeffler,  A.,  Temple,  J.,  2001.  GMM  estimation  of  empirical  growth  models. 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3048. 
Bowsher, C. G., 2002. On testing overidentifying restrictions in dynamic panel data models. 
Economics Letters 77, 211-220. 
Bramall,  C.,  2000.  Sources  of  Chinese  Economic  Growth  1978-1996.  Oxford  University 
Press, Oxford. 
Brandt, L., Hsieh, C. T., Zhu, X. D., 2008. Growth and structural transformation in China. In 
Brandt, L., Rawski, T., China's Great Economic Transformation. Cambridge University 
Press, New York, pp. 683-728. 
Brandt, L., Zhu, X. D., 2000. Redistribution in a decentralized economy: growth and inflation 
in China under reform. Journal of Political Economy 108(2), 422-451. 
Brun, J. F., Combes, J. L., Renard, M. F., 2002. Are there spillover effects between coastal 
and noncoastal regions in China? China Economic Review 13, 161-169. Cai, F., Wang, D. W., Du, Y., 2002. Regional disparity and economic growth in China: the 
impact of labour market distortions. China Economic Review 13, 197-212. 
Chatfield, C., 1995. Model uncertainty, data mining, and statistical inference. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society 158, 419-444. 
Chen, B. Z., Feng, Y., 2000. Determinants of economic growth in China: private enterprise, 
education and openness. China Economic Review 11, 1-15. 
Chen, J., Fleisher, B. M., 1996. Regional income inequality and economic growth in China. 
Journal of Comparative Economics 22, 141-164. 
Corden, W. M., 1974. Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Cull, R., Xu, L. C., 2005. Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit 
reinvestment among Chinese firms. Journal of Financial Economics 77(1), 117-146. 
Démurger, S., 2001. Infrastructure development and economic growth: an explanation for 
regional disparities in China. Journal of Comparative Economics 29, 95-117. 
Ding,  S.,  Knight,  J.,  2008a.  Can  the  augmented  Solow  model  explain  China's  economic 
growth?  A  cross-country  panel  data  analysis.  Department  of  Economics  Discussion 
Paper No. 380, University of Oxford.  
Ding, S., Knight, J., 2008b. Why has China grown so fast? The role of physical and human 
capital formation. Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 414, University of 
Oxford.  
Ding, S., Knight, J., 2008c. Why has China grown so fast? The role of structural change. 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 415, University of Oxford.  
Dollar,  D.,  1992.  Outward-oriented  developing  economies  really  do  grow  more  rapidly: 
evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985. Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, 
523-544. 
Dollar, D., Kraay, A., 2004. Trade, growth, and poverty.  Economic Journal 114, F22-F49. 
Doornik, J. A., Hendry, D. F., 2007. Pcgive 12 Voume I: Empirical Econometric Modelling. 
Timberlake Consultants Press, London. 
Dowrick,  S.,  Gemmell,  N.,  1991.  Industrialization,  catching  up  and  economic  growth:  a 
comparative study across the world's capitalist economies. Economic Journal 101(405), 
263-275. 
Edwards,  S.,  1993.  Openness,  trade  liberalization,  and  growth  in  developing  countries. 
Journal of Economic Literature 31, 1358-1393. 
Edwards, S., 1998. Openness, productivity, and growth: what do we really know? Economic 
Journal 108 (2), 383-398. 
Feder, G., 1986. Growth in semi-industrial countries: a statistical analysis. In Chenery, H.,  
Robinson, S., Syrquin, M., Industrialization and Growth: A Comparative Study. Oxford 
University Press, Washington, D. C, pp. 263-282. 
Fernández, C., Ley, E., Steel, M. F. J., 2001. Model uncertainty in cross-country growth 
regressions. Journal of Applied Econometrics 16 (5), 563-576. 
Frankel,  J.  A.,  Romer,  D.,  1999.  Does  trade  cause  growth?  American  Economic  Review 
89(3), 379-399. 
Garnaut,  R.,  Song,  L.,  Tenev,  S.,  Yao,  Y.,  2005.  China's  Ownership  Transformation: 
Processes, Outcomes, Prospects. World Bank, Washington D.C.. 
Grossman,  G.,  Helpman,  E.,  1995.  Innovation  and  Growth  in  the  Global  Economy.  MIT 
Press, Cambridge MA. 
Guariglia, A., Poncet, S., 2006. Could financial distortions be no impediment to economic 
growth after all? Evidence from China. University of Nottingham China and the World 
Economy Research Paper Series No. 36. 
Guariglia, A., Liu, X., Song, L., 2008. Is the growth of Chinese firms constrained by internal 
finance? Mimeograph, University of Nottingham. Hall,  R.  E.,  Jones,  C.  I.,  1997.  Levels  of  economic  activity  across  countries.  American 
Economic Review 87 (2), 173-177. 
Hall, R. E., Jones, C., 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker 
than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1), 83-116. 
Hao, C., 2006. Development of financial intermediation and economic growth: the Chinese 
experience. China Economic Review 17, 347-362. 
Hasan, I., Wachtel, P., Zhou, M. M., 2008. Institutional development, financial deepening and 
economic growth: evidence from China. Journal of Banking and Finance. 
Hendry, D. F., Krolzig, H. M., 2004. We ran one regression. Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics 66 (5), 799-810. 
Holz,  C.  A.,  2006.  China's  reform  period  economic  growth:  How  reliable  are  Augus 
Maddison's estimates? Review of Income and Wealth 52 (1), 85-119. 
Hoover, K. D., Perez, S. J., 2004. Truth and robustness in cross-country growth regressions. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 66 (5), 765-798. 
Islam, N., 1995. Growth empirics: a panel data approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 
(4), 1127-1170. 
Jefferson, G. H., Mai, L., Zhao, J., 1998. Reforming property rights in China's industry. In 
Jefferson, G. H., Singh, I., Enterprise Reform in China. Oxford University Press, New 
York, pp. 107-125. 
Jones, D. C., Li, C., Owen, A. L., 2003. Growth and regional inequality in China during the 
reform era. China Economic Review 14, 186-200. 
Keidel,  A.,  2007.  China's  looming  crisis  --  inflation  returns.  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International Peace Policy Brief 54. 
Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1995. Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using 
alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics 7 (3), 207-227. 
Knight, J., Li, S., 1999. Fiscal decentralization: incentives, redistribution and reform in China. 
Oxford Development Studies 27 (1), 5-32. 
Knight, J., Song, L., 2005. Towards a Labour Market in China. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Kraay,  A.,  1999.  Exports  and  economic  performance:  evidence  from  a  panel  of  Chinese 
enterprises. Revue d'Economie Du Developpement 1(2), 183-207. 
Lardy, R. N., 2002. China will keep on growing. Wall Street Journal Asia 14. 
Lawrence, R. Z., 1996. Single World, Divided Nations? OECD, Paris. 
Leamer, E. E., 1983. Let's take the con out of econometrics. American Economic Review 73 
(1), 31-43. 
Leamer, E. E., 1985. Sensitivity analysis would help. American Economic Review 75(3), 
308-313. 
Leamer,  E.  E.,  1988. Measures  of  openness.  In  Baldwin,  R.  E.,  Trade  Policy Issues  and 
Empirical Analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 147-204. 
Levine,  R.,  Renelt,  D.,  1992.  A  sensitivity  analysis  of  cross-country  growth  regressions. 
American Economic Review 82 (4), 942-963. 
Lewis, W. A., 1954. Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour. Manchester 
School of Economic and Social Studies 22, 139-191. 
Li, H., Liu, Z. N., Rebelo, I., 1998. Testing the neoclassical theory of economic growth: 
evidence from Chinese provinces. Economics of Planning 31, 117-132. 
Lin,  Y.  F.,  1992.  Rural  reforms  and  agricultural  growth  in  China.  American  Economic 
Review 82 (1), 34-51. 
Lin, Y. F., Zhu, T., 2001. Ownership restructuring in Chinese state industry: an analysis of 
evidence on initial organizational changes. China Quarterly 166, 298-334. Lin,  Y.  F.,  2007.  Development  and  Transition:  Idea,  Strategy,  and  Viability.  Marshall 
Lecture, Cambridge University. 
Liu,  X.,  Burridge,  P.,  Sinclair,  P.  J.  N.,  2002.  Relationships  between  economic  growth, 
foreign direct investment and trade: evidence from China. Applied Economics 34(11), 
1433-1440. 
Lucas,  R.  E.,  1988.  On  the  mechanics  of  economic  development.  Journal  of  Monetary 
Economics 22, 3-42. 
Maddison, A., 1998. Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run. OECD, Paris. 
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D., Weil, D. N., 1992. A contribution to the empirics of economic 
growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2), 407-437. 
Mauro, P., 1995. Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (3), 681-712. 
Naughton, B., 2006. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. MIT Press, Cambridge 
MA. 
North, D., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
Nye, H. L. M., Reddy, S. G., Watkins, K., 2002. Dollar and Kraay on 'Trade, Growth, and 
Poverty': A Critique. Unpublished manuscript. 
Owen, P. D., 2003. General-to-specific modelling using Pcgets. Journal of Economic Surveys 
17(4), 609-627. 
Park, A., Yang, D., Shi, X. Z., Jiang, Y., 2008. Exporting and firm performance: Chinese 
exporters and the Asian financial crisis. Conference on 'Confronting the Challenge of 
Technology for Development: Experiences from the BRICS', University of Oxford.  
Poirson,  H.,  2001.  The  impact  of  intersectoral  labour  reallocation  on  economic  growth. 
Journal of African Economies 10 (1), 37-63. 
Pritchett, L., 1996. Measuring outward orientation in developing countries: can it be done? 
Journal of Development Economics 49 (2), 307-335. 
Raiser, M., 1998. Subsidising inequality: economic reforms, fiscal transfers and convergence 
across Chinese provinces. Journal of Development Studies 34 (3), 1-26. 
Ravallion,  M.,  Chen,  S.  H.,  2007.  China’s  (uneven)  progress  against  poverty.  Journal  of 
Development Economics 82, 1-42. 
Rawski, T., 2001. What is happening to China's GDP statistics? China Economic Review 12, 
347-354. 
Rodríguez, F., Rodrik, D., 2001. Trade policy and economic growth: a sceptic's guide to the 
cross-national  evidence.  In  Bernanke,  B.  S.,  Rogoff,  K.  S.,  Rogoff,  K.,  NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2000. MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 261-324. 
Rodrik, D. 1999. The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness 
Work. Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington, D.C.. 
Rodrik, D., 2003. Introduction: what do we learn from country narratives? In Rodrik, D., In 
Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth. Princeton University 
Press,  Princeton and Oxford, pp. 1-19. 
Romer,  P.  M.,  1990.  Are  nonconvexities  important  for  understanding  growth?  American 
Economic Review 80(2), 97-103. 
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A. M., 1995. Economic reform and the process of economic integration. 
Brookings Papers of Economic Activity, 1-118. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. X., 1997. I just ran two million regressions. American Economic Review 87 
(2), 178-183. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. X., Doppelhofer, G., Miller, R., 2004. Determinants of long-run growth: a 
Bayesian  Averaging  of  Classical  Estimates  (BACE)  approach.  American  Economic 
Review 94 (4), 813-835. 
Scott, M. F., 1989. A New View of Economic Growth. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Solow, R. M., 1956. A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 70, 65-94. 
Taylor,  J.  R.,  1988.  Rural  employment  trends  and  the  legacy  of  surplus  labour.  China 
Quarterly 116, 736-766. 
Temple, J., 1999. The new growth evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 37 (1), 112-156. 
Temple,  J.,  2000.  Growth  regressions  and  what  the  textbooks  don’t  tell  you.  Bulletin  of 
Economic Research 52, 181–205. 
Temple, J., Wöβmann, L., 2006. Dualism and cross-country growth regressions. Journal of 
Economic Growth 11, 187-228. 
Vollrath,  D.,  2005.  How  important  are  dual  economy  effects  for  aggregate  productivity? 
Manuscript, University of Houston. 
Wacziarg, R., 2001. Measuring the dynamic gains from trade. World Bank Economic Review 
15 (3), 393-429. 
Wei, S. J., 1995. Open door policy and China's rapid growth: evidence from city-level data. In 
Ito, T., Krueger, A., Growth Theories in Light of the East Asian Experience. University 
of Chicago Press. 
Windmeijer, F., 2005. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step 
GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics 126, 25-51. 
Winters,  L.  A.,  2004.  Trade  liberalisation  and  economic  performance:  an  overview.  
Economic Journal 114, F4-F21. 
Yanikkaya,  H.,  2003.  Trade  openness  and  economic  growth:  a  cross-country  empirical 
investigation. Journal of Development Economics 72, 57-89. 
Yao, S., 2006. On economic growth, FDI and exports in China. Applied Economics 38, 339-
351. 
Ying, L. G., 2003. Understanding China's recent growth experience: a spatial econometric 
perspective. The Annals of Regional Science 37, 613-628. 
Young, A., 2003. Gold into base metal: productivity growth in the People's Republic of China 
during the reform period. Journal of Political Economy 111 (6), 1220-1261. 




    
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Provincial GDP Per Capita Growth Rates 
  Full-sample period    Sub-sample periods 
  1978-2006    1978-1987  1988-1997  1998-2006 
All provinces (30 provinces)  0.076 
(0.058) 






Coastal provinces (11 provinces)  0.082 
(0.058) 






Interior provinces (19 provinces)  0.072 
(0.058) 






Highest growth province  0.102 
(0.061) 






Lowest growth province  0.055 
(0.060) 






Note:  Mean  values  and  standard  deviations  (in  parentheses)  are  provided;  coastal  provinces  consist  of 
Liaoning,  Hebei,  Tianjin,  Shandong,  Jiangsu,  Shanghai,  Zhejiang,  Fujian,  Guangdong,  and  Hainan,  plus 
Beijing; and interior provinces include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan; for 
the full-sample period, the highest growth province was Zhejiang, and the lowest growth province was Gansu; 
for the three sub-sample periods, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong were the highest growth provinces respectively, 
and Shanghai, Tibet, Yunnan were the corresponding lowest growth provinces. 
 
 
Table 2.  Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) Results 






   100.0  0.207  0.042 
   100.0  -0.019  0.007 
   96.9  -0.053  0.022 
   93.4  0.352  0.175 
   62.2  0.006  0.006 
   29.7  0.011  0.022 
   29.3  0.015  0.029 
   27.8  -0.432  0.904 
   24.8  0.017  0.039 
   10.8  -0.001  0.006 
   7.8  -0.006  0.041 
   7.3  0.001  0.006 
   5.4  0.009  0.123 
   4.3  -0.002  0.022 
Notes: Estimation is based on cross-sectional data; Dependent variable: growth rate of real provincial 




Table 3.  General-to-Specific (GETS) Model Selection Results 
Regressor  Coefficient  Standard 
Error  t-value  t-probability  Part.  
   0.248  0.038  6.515  0.000  0.649 
   -0.025  0.006  -4.307  0.000  0.447 
   0.059  0.027  2.234  0.036  0.178 
   0.309  0.147  2.104  0.047  0.161 
   -1.854  0.891  -2.082  0.049  0.159 
   0.041  0.021  1.934  0.066  0.139 
   -0.056  0.018  -3.134  0.005  0.299 
           
Sigma         0.007                 RSS      0.001    0.767                 
F(6,23)        12.64 [0.000]     LogLik    108.627                           T       30 




Chi^2(2)  =   1.872  [0.393] 
Testing for heteroscedasticity  F(12,10)  =    0.558  [0.832] 
Notes:  This  is  the  OLS  estimation  of  final  specific  model  based  on  cross-sectional  data;  Dependent 
variable: growth rate of real provincial GDP per capita. 
 
Table 4. System GMM Estimation Results of the Baseline Model 
Regressor  Without Coastal Dummy  With Coastal Dummy 
  Coefficient  Robust 
S.E.  Coefficient  Robust 
S.E.  Coefficient  Robust 
S.E.  
   0.404**  0.078      0.403**  0.078 
   -0.055**  0.008  0.036**  0.004  -0.056**  0.009 
   0.151**  0.036      0.157**  0.048 
   1.329**  0.301      1.334**  0.298 
   -4.349**  1.282      -4.217**  1.329 
   0.083**  0.019      0.079**  0.019 
    -0.036**  0.013      -0.037**  0.012 
           0.003  0.012 
   
   0.944  0.811  0.955 
   0.835  0.362  0.904 
   0.316  0.966  0.276 
   148  150  148 
Notes: 5-year interval panel data is used for estimation; robust standard error refers to heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard error;   is treated as pre-determined,   is treated as exogenous, and all 
other variables are treated as endogenous; ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different 
from zero at the 5 and 10 percent significance level respectively. 
 
 Table 5. Robustness Tests for Openness (Trade Volumes and Changes of Trade Volumes) 
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 


























































































   0.043** 
(0.011) 
          0.017** 
(0.008) 
   
     0.079** 
(0.019) 
          0.016 
(0.017) 
 
       0.085** 
(0.017) 
          0.075** 
(0.017) 
         0.177** 
(0.031) 
    0.162** 
(0.030) 
   
           0.187** 
(0.025) 
    0.169** 
(0.022) 
 
             0.089** 
(0.029) 
    0.079** 
(0.035) 




































                   
   0.902  0.955  0.839  0.531  0.486  0.521  0.450  0.438  0.555 
   0.920  0.904  0.910  0.986  0.891  0.941  0.972  0.965  0.931 
   0.251  0.276  0.295  0.507  0.487  0.297  0.431  0.252  0.345 
   148  148  148  147  147  147  147  147  147 31 
 
Table 6. Robustness Tests for Institutional Change (of Investment, Output and Employment) 
Regressor  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16  Model 17  Model 18 












































































































   -0.107** 
(0.026) 
               
     -0.008 
(0.062) 
             
       0.188* 
(0.111) 
           
         -0.037** 
(0.012) 
         
           -0.007 
(0.036) 
       
             0.033* 
(0.017) 
     
               -0.169** 
(0.056) 
   
                 -0.131** 
(0.061) 
 
                   0.175** 
(0.034) 


















   0.941  0.991  0.607  0.955  0.902  0.622  0.577  0.747  0.296 
   0.910  0.904  0.902  0.904  0.875  0.778  0.948  0.869  0.944 
   0.260  0.262  0.223  0.276  0.249  0.210  0.344  0.310  0.359 
   148  148  148  148  124  124  148  148  148 32 
 
Table 7. Robustness Tests for Sectoral Change (Hypotheses of Temple and Wöβmann, 2006; Poirson, 2001; and Industrialization) 
Regressor  Model 19  Model 20  Model 21  Model 22  Model 23  Model 24  Model 25  Model 26  Model 27  Model 28  Model 29 






























































































































































        1.057** 
(0.179) 
       
   0.841 
(2.108) 
  3.791 
(2.732) 
               




           
         -1.141 
(4.678) 
  7.956 
(6.856) 
         




     
                   0.028 
(0.042) 
  -0.033 
(0.031) 


























                       
   0.370  0.338  0.960  0.179  0.194  0.931  0.501  0.651  0.977  0.260  0.245 
   0.953  0.964  0.963  0.981  0.967  0.963  0.998  0.993  0.920  0.977  0.995 
   0.254  0.229  0.282  0.140  0.141  0.293  0.490  0.414  0.402  0.505  0.556 























Figure 1. China's Annual Growth Rate of GDP Per Capita (%) 
Figure 2.  Trade Volumes of the Chinese Economy
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 





Data source: World Bank Development Indicators (April 2008). 
 
 
Data source: Own calculation based on WDI data.  
 
 
Figure 3. The Composition of China's Exports




Fuel exports   Manufactures exports
Figure 4. Changes of Trade Volumes in the Chinese Economy (%) 
Annual growth of exports Annual growth of imports Annual growth of trade35 
 
Appendix 1 : Model Selection Procedures 
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) 
The following brief discussion of the theory behind BMA draws heavily on Raftery (1995), 
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), Malik and Temple (2005) and Huang (2005).  
A natural way to think about model uncertainty is to admit that we do not know which model 
is 'true' and instead, attach probabilities to different possible models. BMA treats parameters 
and models as random variables and summarizes the uncertainty about the model in terms of 
a probability distribution over the space of all possible models. 
Suppose  we  want  to  make  inference  about  an  unknown  quantity  of  interest  (such  as  a 
parameter),    ,  given  data  .  There  are  a  large  number  of  possible  statistical  models, 
 for the data space. If we consider only linear regression models but are unsure 
about  which    possible  regressors  to  include,  there  could  be  as  many  as    models 
considered. Bayes' rule and basic probability theory suggest that the posterior distribution of 
the parameters is the weighted average of all the possible conditional posterior densities with 
the weights given by the posterior probabilities of each of the possible models. Then the 
posterior distribution of   given data   is 
                                              ,                        (A.1) 
where    is the posterior distribution of   given the model  , and   
is the posterior model probability. Thus the BMA posterior distribution of   is a weighted 
average  of  the  posterior  distributions  of    under  each  of  the  models,  weighted  by  their 
posterior model probabilities.  
Based on Bayes' theorem, the posterior model probability is given by  
                                                    ,                                   (A.2) 
where    is  the  prior  probability  of  model ,  and    is  the  integrated 
likelihood of model   , obtained by integrating over the unknown parameters 
                                       ,                   (A.3) 
where   is the parameter of model  ,    is the likelihood of   under model 
 , and   is the prior distribution over the parameter space associated with 
model   . The integrated likelihood   is a high dimensional integral that can be 
hard  to  calculate  analytically,  and  therefore  some  simplification  and  approximations  are 
required. Raftery (1995) proposes that a convenient solution is to approximate twice the log 
Bayes factor using the Bayesian Information Criterion ( ) due to Schwarz (1978). One 
important  advantage  of  the    approximation  is  that  it  avoids  the  need  for  an  explicit 
specification for the prior distributions  . To represent no prior preference for any 
model,  each  model  presumed  equally  likely  before  examining  the  data,  i.e.  all  possible 36 
 
models have equal prior probabilities or  . Then the posterior model probability 
can be calculated as  
                                                     .                                    (A.4) 
Then we are ready to implement a systematic form of inference for different parameters of 
interest, which is superior to the ad hoc strategies often used in cross-province growth study 
on  China.  One  potential  difficulty  in  implementing  BMA  is  the  sheer  range  of  possible 
models. To deal with this problem, Occam's Window technique and Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo  techniques  can  be  adopted.  The  former  focuses  on  a  subset  defined  by  Occam's 
Window technique and treats all the worst-fitting models outside the subset as having zero 
posterior  probability.  Embodying  the  principle  of  parsimony,  this  method  considerably 
reduces the number of possible models, and in the meantime encompasses the inherent model 
uncertainty present. The latter has the advantage of simultaneously selecting variables and 
identifying outliers, but requires a larger sample size relative to the regressor set. Given our 
small sample size (N=30), we use the package bicreg for S-Plus or R written by Adrian 
Raftery, where the computational procedure for Occam's Window technique is implemented 
to exclude the relatively unlikely models. 
General-to-specific approach (GETS) 
The following brief discussion of general-to-specific methodology draws heavily on Owen 
(2003),  Hendry  and  Krolzig  (2004),  Hoover  and  Perez  (2004),  and  Doornik  and  Hendry 
(2007). 
The  general-to-specific  model  selection  is  also  referred  to  as  the  LSE  approach  to 
econometric  modelling.  It  begins  with  the  idea  that  the  truth  can  be  characterized  by  a 
sufficiently rich regression (the general regression), i.e. if every possible variable is included 
in the regression, then the general regression must contain all the information about the true 
determinants.  However,  the  model  may  not  be  in  a  perspicacious  form,  therefore  the 
information  content  can  be  sharpened  by  a  more  parsimonious  regression  (the  specific 
regression).  The  specific  regression  is  a  valid  restriction  of  the  general  model  if  it  is 
statistically well specified and it encompasses every other parsimonious regression.   
The specification of the general unrestricted model (GUM) from which reductions commence 
is crucial to the performance of GETS approach, i.e. the specific model will not be able to 
improve on a bad GUM. Economic theory and previous empirical findings can play a central 
role in providing 'prior simplification'. Once a GUM is specified, insignificant variables are 
eliminated to reduce complexity, and diagnostic checks (normality test, heteroscedasticity 
test, F test for parameter constancy and Reset test for function form) on the validity of these 
reductions ensures congruence of the final model. In order to keep all promising variables in 
the final model, we set the target size as huge (level of significance: 0.1).  
The computing software we use to implement GETS modelling is Autometrics (part of Pcgive 
12 in OxMetrics 5, which was recently released in late 2007). It is an upgraded version of 37 
 
Pcgets, taking many features of the earlier implementations, but also differing in several 
important aspects. For example, Autometrics relied much less on presearch as the simulation 
experiments  show  almost  the  same  operating  characteristics  with  and  without  presearch; 
Autometrics does not implement the multiple-path search (which is an unstructured way of 
searching the model space), instead, it considers the whole search space from the outset using 
a tree search, discarding parts in a systematic way; while using roughly the same battery of 
diagnostic tests, Autometrics postpones the testing until a candidate terminal model has been 
found,  and  if  necessary,  backtracking  is  used  to  find  a  valid  model,  making  the 
implementation  faster  and  resulting  in  more  parsimonious  models;  and  a  block-search 
algorithm is used by Autometrics to handle the case of more variables than observations. In 
brief, simulation results show that Autometrics is similar with Pcgets in terms of power, but 
had better size performance in some cases. 
 
Appendix 2 : Temple and Wöβmann (2006)'s model 
Section 6 draws on Temple and Wöβmann (2006). They developed an empirical model to 
examine  the  impact  of  labour  reallocation  on  aggregate  productivity  growth  and  they 
augmented the conventional growth regressions based on the MRW framework so as to allow 
for sectoral change. Their basic idea is that changes in the structure of employment will raise 
aggregate  productivity  when  the  marginal  product  of  labour  varies  across  sectors.  If  the 
marginal product of labour is lower in agriculture, then the movement of agricultural workers 
to sectors where the marginal product is higher will raise total output. Since this additional 
output is produced  without change in the total input of capital and labour, the reallocation of 
labour raises aggregate productivity. 
It is a general equilibrium model of production with two sectors (a rural agricultural and an 
urban non-agricultural sector) and two factors (capital and labour). Total output is given by 
                                                      ,                                                           (A.5) 
where   is the relative price of the urban sector good;   and   are output quantities in 
agriculture and non-agriculture; and   is a GDP price deflator. The production function 
in each sector has constant returns to scale and is given by 
                                                             ,                                                  (A.6) 
                                                            ,                                                (A.7)             
where    and   are TFP in agriculture and non-agriculture respectively. Assuming that 
workers are paid their marginal products gives  
                                                                  ,                                                         (A.8) 
                                                                ,                                                       (A.9) 
where    and    are  wages  in  agriculture  and  non-agriculture  respectively;  and  the   
subscript  denotes  the  partial  derivative  with  respect  to  labour.  Capital  also  receives  its 38 
 
marginal  product  in  both  sectors,  i.e.  ,  where    is  the  rental  rate  on 
capital  and  the    subscript  is  the  partial  derivative  with  respect  to  capital.  This  model 
assumes  that  any  observed  effects  of  reallocation  arise  because  of  marginal  product 
differentials and that the propensity to migrate depends on the ratio of wages in the two 
sectors. Migration will cease when the intersectoral wage ratio falls to a level denoted by  , 
so the long-run migration equilibrium is 
                                                                  ,                                                        (A.10) 
where  .  The relationship between the extent of sectoral change and wage ratio can be 
expressed as 
                                                            ,                                          (A.11) 
where    is  the  migration  propensity,  defined  by    ,  where    is  the  share  of 
agricultural employment in total employment; and   is the speed of adjustment to the long-
run equilibrium. The 'odds ratio' for migration is increasing in the wage gap between the two 
sectors. Rearranging (A.11) gives  
                                                                 ,                                           (A.12) 
so the extent of current wage ratio can be deduced using information on the observed pace of 
sectoral change. In this model, the wage differential varies across countries according to the  
value of    . By assuming that the speed of adjustment ( ), the equilibrium differential ( ) 
and the labour share in total output ( ) are constant across economies, Temple and 
Wöβmann (2006) derived the following expression for the aggregate Solow residual 
    ,      (A.13)   
where   is the nominal output share for agriculture at time t, or   ;   is the 
labour share in total output, or  ; and   is the share of non-agricultural employment 
in total employment, or   .  
In the presence of an intersectoral wage differential, the aggregate Solow residual can thus be 
decomposed as a weighted average of the sectoral TFP growth rates plus the 'growth bonus' 
obtained by reallocating labour to a sector where its marginal product is higher. Since the 
migration propensity   is related to the extent of sectoral change as measured by   , equation 
(A.13) implies a convex relationship between growth and sectoral change. The intuition is 
that the growth impact of a given extent of sectoral change will be greatest in those countries 
experiencing  more  rapid  sectoral  change,  as  these  are  also  the  countries  in  which  the 
intersectoral wage differential is greatest. Note that the two sectoral change terms in equation 
(A.13)  will  disappear  when  there  is  no  wage  differential  in  equilibrium,  ,  and  the 
adjustment process in response to disequilibrium is instantaneous,  . Since it was not 
possible to measure capital stocks at the sectoral level, Temple and Wöβmann (2006) treated 39 
 
sectoral TFP as unobservable and relied on a vector   to capture the cross-section variation in 
aggregate TFP growth that is not due to sectoral change, as follows 
                       ,                           (A.14) 
where    is  a  vector  of  determinants  of  aggregate  TFP  growth  including  initial  level  of 
aggregate TFP and regional differences in technology and institutions proxied by regional 
dummies; and the sectoral change terms are defined as 
                                                                                        (A.15) 
                                             .                                      (A.16) 
Temple and Wöβmann (2006) then extended MRW's model by including the sectoral change 
terms derived above to proxy the varying productivity growth across countries. Given the 
Cobb-Douglas  production  function  ),  TFP  growth  is  equal  to  the 
growth rate of efficiency ( ) times the exponent on the efficiency index ( ). In the 
presence of wage differentials, TFP growth is a function of sectoral change terms as shown in 
equation (A.14). Then the extension of MRW's model takes the form 
     ,  (A.17) 
where   is a vector of explanatory variables including rates of saving, physical and human 
capital accumulation. Thus, the specification of equation (A.17) is a hybrid of the Solow 
model  with  an  aggregate  production  function  and  a  two-sector  framework  with  sectoral 
product differentials.  
Despite its approximations and limits, this model has a number of comparative advantages. 
Firstly, compared with the conventional MRW models, equation (A.17) allows for cross-
country  variation  in  productivity  growth  by  taking  into  account  the  effect  of  labour 
reallocation  between  sectors  with  different  productivity.  Secondly,  unlike  the  use  of 
accounting  methods  to  measure  TFP  growth,  this  model  does  not  involve  the  task  of 
measuring the capital stock, which might be problematic for developing countries.    
When  replacing  the  assumption  that  the  labour  share  in  output,    ,  is  the  same  across 
countries by an assumption that all countries have the same Cobb-Douglas technologies in 
agriculture, Temple and Wöβmann (2006) constructed a second set of sectoral change terms  
                                                                                    (A.18) 
                                        ,                                             (A.19) 
where   is the share of agriculture in total value added. This alternative set of sectoral change 
terms adds   , i.e. the share of agriculture in value added divided by the share of employment.    40 
 
Appendix 3 
Adjusted Data List used in the Regressions, 30 Provinces, 1978-2006 
 
Variable  Definition  Units 
Dependent variables 
gi,t  Growth rate of real provincial GDP per capita   percent 
Independent variables 
1. Initial income variable 
lnyi,t-1  Logarithm of beginning-period real GDP per capita  1990 RMB 
2. Physical capital formation 
(1) By national account classification 
gcf_gdp  Gross capital formation to GDP  percent 
fcf_gdp  Fixed capital formation to GDP  percent 
inven_gdp  Inventory investment to GDP (inven_gdp = gcf_gdp-fcf_gdp)  percent 
fcf_gcf  Fixed capital formation to gross capital formation  percent 
(2) By usage classification 
finvTOTAL_gdp  Total investment in fixed assets to GDP  percent 
finvCC_gdp  Fixed investment in capital construction to GDP  percent 
finvINNO_gdp  Fixed investment in innovation to GDP  percent 
finvOTHER_gdp  Fixed investment in other usage to GDP  
(finvOTHER_gdp = finvTOTAL_gdp- finvCC_gdp- finvINNO_gdp) 
percent 
(3) Domestic vs foreign investment 
finvDOM_gdp  Ratio of domestic fixed investment to GDP   percent 
fdi_gdp  Ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP (FDI converted to RMB 
using official exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
percent 
fdi  Volume of foreign direct investment (FDI converted to RMB using 
official exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
billion RMB 
finvDOM  Volume of domestic investment  billion RMB 
(4) By ownership classification 
finvSOE_finvTOTAL  Investment in fixed assets by state-owned units / Total investment in 
fixed assets 
percent 
finvCOL_finvTOTAL  Investment in fixed assets by collectively-owned units / Total 
investment in fixed assets 
percent 
finvPRIV_finvTOTAL  Investment in fixed assets by private units / Total investment in 
fixed assets 
percent 
finvDOM_PRIV_finvTOTAL  Investment in fixed assets by domestic private units / Total 
investment in fixed assets 
percent 
3. Human capital formation 
stuPRIM_pop  Students Enrolled in Primary Education / Year-end total population  percent 
stuSEC_pop  Students  Enrolled  in  Secondary  Education  /  Year-end  total 
population 
percent 
stuREG_SEC_pop  Students Enrolled in Regular Secondary Education / Year-end total 
population 
percent 
stuHIGH_pop  Students Enrolled in Higher Education / Year-end total population  percent 
stuUNI&COL_pop  Students  Enrolled  in  Universities  and  Colleges  /  Year-end  total  percent 41 
 
population 
stuHIGH_stuREG_SEC   Students  Enrolled  in  Higher  Education  /  Students  Enrolled  in 
Regular Secondary Education 
percent 
stuSEC&HIGH_pop  Students Enrolled in both secondary and higher Education / Year-
end total population 
percent 
4. Population growth rate 
pop_ngr_nbs  Population natural growth rate = Birth rate - death rate  percent 
pop_gr  Annual population growth rate = Log difference of total population  percent 
5. Degree of openness 
(1) Trade volumes 
trade_gdp  Ratio  of  exports  and  imports  to  GDP  (Exports  and  imports 
converted to RMB using official exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
percent 
export_gdp  Ratio of exports to GDP (Exports converted to RMB using official 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
percent 
import_gdp  Ratio of imports to GDP (Imports converted to RMB using official 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
percent 
(2) Changes of trade volumes 
trade_gr  Growth  rate  of  trade  volumes (Exports  and  imports  converted  to 
RMB using official exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
percent 
export_gr  Growth rate of exports (Exports converted to RMB using official 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
percent 
import_gr  Growth rate of imports (Imports converted to RMB using official 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
percent 
(3) Foreign direct investment 
fdi_gdp  Ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP (FDI converted to RMB 
using official exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
percent 
fdi  Volume of foreign direct investment (FDI converted to RMB using 
official exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
billion RMB 
6. Institutional change 
(1) Of investment 
finvSOE_finvTOTAL  Investment in fixed assets by state-owned units / Total investment in 
fixed assets 
percent 
finvCOL_finvTOTAL  Investment in fixed assets by collectively-owned units / Total 
investment in fixed assets 
percent 
finvPRIV_finvTOTAL  Investment in fixed assets by private units / Total investment in fixed 
assets 
percent 
(2) Of industrial output 
indSOE_indTOTAL  Output value of state-owned enterprises  / Gross industrial output 
value 
percent 
indCOL_indTOTAL  Output value of collective enterprises  / Gross industrial output value  percent 
indPRIV_indTOTAL  Output value of private enterprises  / Gross industrial output value  percent 
(3) Of employment 
wokSOE_wokTOTAL  State-owned enterprise workers / Total staff and workers  percent 
WokCOL_wokTOTAL  Collective enterprise workers / Total staff and workers  percent 
WokPRIV_wokTOTAL  Private enterprise workers / Total staff and workers    percent 42 
 
7. Sectoral change  
(1) Temple and Wöβmann (2006)'s specification 
s  Agricultural share of GDP (Primary sector GDP / Total GDP)  percent 
a  Agricultural share of employment (Primary sector employment / 
Total number of employed persons) 
percent 
m  Non-agricultural share of employment (m=1-a)  percent 
p  Migration propensity (p= -4 a/a)   
MGROWTH  Linear sectoral change term: Change of non-agricultural share  of 
employment (4m) 
percent 
DISEQ  Non-linear sectoral change term: Change of non-agricultural share 
of employment adjusted by migration propensity (p/(1-p)* 4m) 
percent 
MGROWTH2  Linear sectoral change term: Change of non-agricultural share of 
employment * Average labour productivity in agricultural sector (4 
m*s/a) 
percent 
DISEQ2  Non-linear sectoral change term: Change of non-agricultural share 
of employment adjusted by migration propensity * Average labour 
productivity in agricultural sector (p/(1-p)*4 m*s/a) 
percent 
(2) Poirson (2001)'s specification 
MGROWTH*RLP  Change in employment share in non-agricultural sector weighted by 
relative  labour  productivity  (RLP  =  ratio  of  average  labour 
productivity in non-agriculture to that in agriculture) 
percent 
(3) Degree of industrialization 
deofin  Degree of industrialization (Gross industrial output value / (Gross 
industrial output value + Gross agricultural output value)) 
percent 
gr_deofin  Growth rate of degree of industrialization (4 deofin)  percent 
8. Infrastructure 
railway_area  Mileages of railways per square kilometre (Total railway length / 
Area) 
percent 
highway_area  Mileages of highways per square kilometre (Total highways length / 
Area) 
percent 
post&tele_gdp  Business volume of post and telecommunication  / GDP  percent 
9. Financial development 
loan_gdp  Total bank loan outstanding / GDP  percent 
saving_gdp  Savings deposit in urban and rural areas / GDP  percent 
10. Geographic location 
dumcoastal  A  dummy  variable  which  is  equal  to  one  for  coastal  provinces 
(Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan, plus Beijing), and zero otherwise. 
0 or 1 





Pre-test data cleaning rules 
o  Treat any observation of annual growth rate of GDP per capita / per worker above - / 
+ 25% as outlier;  
o  Treat any observation of annual population growth rate above - / + 8% as outlier;  
o  Treat any observation of annual employment growth rate above - / + 8%  as outlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 